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THE CONCEPT OF SĀKṢĪ

IN

ADVAITA VEDĀNTA

A. K. CHATTERJEE
R. R. DRAVID
Department of Philosophy, B. H. U.

BANARAS HINDU UNIVERSITY
1979

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FOREWORD

In the present work Dr. A. K. Chatterjee and Dr. R. R. Dravid have made a systematic and critical study of the concept of Sākṣī as it has been formulated and developed in the Advaita Vedānta. The concept of Sākṣī occupies a most important place in the Advaita Vedānta and is vital for a thorough understanding of the Advaita-metaphysics, epistemology and its philosophy of *mokṣa*. It provides a deep insight into the deeper dimensions of human personality. The study of Sākṣī thus constitutes a study of man in depth. It shows his involvement in time and history and makes him aware of his existential situation. But it at the same time makes man conscious of his transcendence, of his essential and inherent freedom from time and history and of his capacity to keep himself free from the illusions and sufferings of life.

The learned authors have discussed the concept of Sākṣī in its proper historical perspective. The book provides a clear idea of how this concept was developed in the Upaniṣads, the Pre-Śaṅkara Vedānta, by Śaṅkara himself and his great followers. The authors have taken great pains in analysing and examining the nature of Sākṣī in the light of the views propounded in some of the standard texts of the Advaita Vedānta. They have brought out the distinction of Sākṣī from Brahman, Īśvara and Jīva with great clarity and thoroughness. The book is a brilliant scholarly work

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and should make a distinct and valuable contribution to the extant literature on the Advaita Vedānta.

The book has been published by utilizing the grants made by the University Grants Commission for publication by this Department. We express our grateful thanks to the Commission for these grants.

We also thank the Manager and the staff of the Banaras Hindu University Press for undertaking the responsibility of printing the book.

Our thanks and appreciation are also due to Shri K. N. Mishra, Reader of this Department, who has taken great pains in going through the proofs and has all along shown keen and active interest in the publication of this work.

R. S. MISRA
Malaviya Professor of Comparative Religion and Head of the Department of Philosophy

Banaras Hindu University

March 20, 1979

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I have to inform the readers with deep regret that our esteemed colleague Dr. R. R. Dravid, one of the authors of the present work, left his mortal coil before it could see the light of the day. He expired on 30-3-1979

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PREFACE

Considering the crucial importance of the basic concept of Sākṣī, it is surprising that its discussion is so scanty and unsystematic in the modern exegetical literature on Advaita Vedānta. Hardly any attention is paid to the aura of unclarity surrounding the notion. Even in the classical literature, attention devoted to the elucidation of the concept is not adequate. We collected together the scatterd passages in the texts where some attempt at exegesis has been made and we discovered that the discussion is not at all plentiful. Sharp distinctions do not emerge, implications are not fully worked out. It appears that the notion of sākṣī was so primary in Advaita epistemology that it was more or less taken for granted, requiring no further investigation. No major debate raged round the concept with the result that precision was not called forth. Conceptual boundaries were not carefully delineated and much looseness remains in our interpretation of the notion. A modest attempt is made here to fill the lacuna in our understanding of an ancient tradition. Most of the important texts were surveyed by us, relevant passages culled together, and what follows is a more or less connected account of the material collected. We do not claim any originality for our account, as our emphasis had ever been more on coherence of the picture than on branching out in new hermeneutical directions. We are painfully aware of the many loose ends left untied, and we can only hope that our meagre discussion would be sufficiently provocative to scholars who would complete what we have begun.

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ABBREVIATIONS

1. A. S. : *Advaitasiddhi* by Madhusūdana Sarasvatī, Nirṇaya Sāgara Press, Bombay, 1937.
2. Bṛ. : *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad.*
3. B. S. S. B. : *Brahmasūtra Śāṅkarabhāṣyam*, Nirṇaya Sāgara Press, Bombay, 1909.
4. Ch. : *Chāndogya Upaniṣad.*
5. Kaṭha. : *Kaṭha Upaniṣad.*
6. Māṇḍ. : *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad.*
7. Māṇḍ. Kār. : *Māṇḍūkya Kārikā* by Gauḍapāda.
8. Muṇḍ. : *Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad.*
9. P. D. : *Pañcadaśī* by Vidyāraṇyamuni, IInd Ed., Pub. Ratan & Co., Delhi, 1960.
10. P. P. : *Pañcapādikā* by Padmapādācārya.
11. Praś. : *Praśna Upaniṣad.*
12. Ś. B. : *Śāṅkarabhāṣya* on the above *Upaniṣads* and *Māṇḍūkya kārikā*. The above refer to *Ten Principal Upaniṣads* with *Śāṅkarabhāṣya*, Pub. Motilal Banarasidass, 1964.
13. S. B. : *Siddhāntabindu* by Madhusūdana Sarasvatī, IInd Ed., Bhandarkar Research Institute, Poona, 1962.

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14. S. L. S. : *Siddhāntaleśasaṅgraha* by Appayya Dīkṣita, Acyuta Grantha Mālā, Kāśī, Saṁvat 2011 (1954).

15. S. S. : *Saṅkṣepaśārīrakam* by Sarvajñātmamuni, Sankaṭhā Press, Sora Kua, Varanasi, Samvat 2015 (1957).

16. Śveta. : *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad.*

17. Tait. : *Taittirīya Upaniṣad.*

18. Viv. : *Pañcapādikāvivaraṇam* by Prakāśātman, Madras Government Oriental Series, 1958.

19. V. P. : *Vedāntaparibhāṣā* by Dharmarāja Adhvarin, Adyar, 1942.

20. V. S. : *Bṛhadāraṇyakavārtikasāra* by Vidyāraṇyasvāmī, IInd Part, Acyuta Grantha Mālā, Kāśī, Saṁvat 1999 (1942).

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I

INTRODUCTION

Advaita, as the appellation suggests, is a theory of non-dualism, rather than of monism. Identity is not so much asserted, as difference annulled. Identity remains a primary implicate of all propositions rather than itself being expressed through propositions. It is the horizon in which the play of propositions takes place. This negative approach is the characteristic difference between pre—Śaṅkara monistic Vedānta and its transformation by Śaṅkara into non-dualistic absolutism. Every proposition is an assertion of identity, marked by the apparent distinctions which swim at the surface but fail to distort the basic identity. The task of philosophy is to remove these accretions, and not to establish the underlying identity which is given in revelation. Philosophy is asymptotic to reality, it leads upto it but then, the goal reached, itself falls away. Philosophy in its entirety is a kind of cosmic *lakṣaṇā*.

This identity as revealed by the upaniṣads is *Brahman*. *Brahman* is the ultimate reality, and is of the nature of consciousness. It is one without a second, non-dual, the only reality that there is. It is one unitary whole, devoid of any kind of distinction, the prius of everything that could appear in consciousness. It is neutral and passive, neither owning nor repelling, the various ascriptions that might be

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imposed on it. It is characterless, indeterminate, beyond the pale of any kind of predication. Predicates import determination but all determination is essentially negation. It can be characterized only as what could not be characterized; negative description is the only description possible. It is the utter beyond, beyond all language, beyond even all conceptualization.

If we are left with such a completely transcendent reality, it is difficult to see what it can do to motivate and enrich the spiritual pilgrimage towards liberation. Its non-duality would seem to preclude the very possibility of empirical existence. There would be no striving for progress, since there would be nobody to undertake such a striving. There would be no problem and, consequently, no philosophy as the solution to problems. There would be no revelation; to whom would the revelation be directed? There would be no world and no bondage.

Reality therefore has to be shown, not merely as sheer transcendence, something 'out there', but as complete immanence, as the indwelling essence of everything that appears to be. Transcendence, bereft of immanence, itself postulates a duality and, as such, militates against the non-dual nature of reality. There is no incompatibility between these two aspects, which are really two facets of the same situation. If empirical existence had substantial reality of its own, we could talk of transcendence of *Brahman*, as opposed to its immanence within empiricality. Upaniṣads therefore declare that the world is naught!

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Brahman alone exists and, as such, is transcendent. But it is also the reality of the world, in the sense that, when the hollowness of the pretensions of the latter is realized, *Brahman* alone is left over.

It has therefore to be shown how the real gets involved in the unreal, and how the initial mistaken step is to be retraced—the involvement and the withdrawal being both progressions within the unreal. Ontologically, the process never took place, nothing really happened. But still the involvement is there as a fact to be reckoned with. The involvement of the real in the unreal takes two complementary directions, giving rise to two different but related approaches to the absolute. Being in the world is being a subject confronted with the objects. Both are founded on the same reality, viz. *Brahman*, and are to be understood as two orders of ascriptions. They appear as two different sorts of entities, but are essentially one and the same reality. That which brings them together, makes one relevant to the other, is *Brahman*, which is reached as the result of an essentialistic analysis of both the knower and the known. Nothing has done more harm to Advaita as giving it an idealistic and subjectivistic twist. Advaita Vedānta is a subtly realistic metaphysics. The subject or the knower is never claimed to be the sole reality; the object known is equally real in its own right. What saves the theory from naive realism is the doctrine that neither term in the knowledge situation enjoys an intrinsic reality of its own. Both are ascriptions, appearances of the same reality,

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which latter is thus to be equated with neither. *Brahman* is not more of a subject than an object. Both are equally unreal, but based equally on the same ground. *Brahman* as the reality to be known, and *ātman* as the knower, coalesce in the final analysis.

There is thus a two-fold investigation into the nature of the ground on which all duality is based. There is, first, unearthing the ground of the world of phenomena, that underlying principle which lends intelligibility to the objects, that because of which the latter can stand out as 'objects' at all. There is, on the other hand, digging into the depths of the subject, an analysis of the complexities of the knowing process, an investigation into the structured stratification of the knowing self. What is the self ? What constitutes the 'selfhood' of the subject ? How is it to be demarcated from the object ? Could it itself be distinguished as an object ? How does it reveal or illumine its object ? The Advaitin tries to answer these quistions, and in his attempt to reach the very foundation of knowing, he arrives at the notion of a 'witness-self' or *sākṣī*, which stands behind everything that is known, which shines forth in its own light which never goes out, which is in itself and not in relation to something else, which reveals eternally and without break, which remains awake when everything goes to sleep. This *sākṣī* is the ground of the notion of 'I', the reality to which the latter is ascribed. It is the basic epistemological principle of Advaita Vedānta.

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II

ANTICIPATIONS AND ADUMBRATIONS

The upaniṣadic seers were literally god-intoxicated people. All their energy was so entirely dedicated to the ecstatic contemplation of the supreme reality that they had little time or inclination for the mundane business of theorizing. It remains true nevertheless that all the later theoretic developments can be traced back to some upaniṣadic passage or other. The concept of *sākṣī* seems to be a much later elaboration. In the upaniṣads the term is present only in compounds, though many other words and concepts have their stray occurrence there which can be taken as anticipating the later systematic development.

The key passage is the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* text: *yat sākṣād aparokṣād brahma* (3.4.1). *Brahman* is described as the underlying essence of all being (*sarvāntarātmā*). The term does not apply to *sākṣī* as such in the technical sense, but rather to a non-differentiated principle which can indifferently refer either to *sākṣī* or *brahman*. Compounds like '*sarvasākṣī*'[1] '*nityasākṣī*'[2] also occur but it is difficult to assign any precise referent to these terms. They could mean *brahman*, *sākṣī* (in the technical sense) or even *Iśvara*. In *Siddhāntabindu*[3] certain upaniṣadic texts are adduced as proof for the existence of *sākṣī*[4], but in none of them does the term '*sākṣī*' occur. The proof might as well be that of *brahman*.

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Other concepts similar in meaning, that are found in the upaniṣads are: *prājña*[5], *draṣṭā* or *vijñātā*[6], *antaryāmī*[7], *Īśvara*[8], *ātmajyoti*[9] or *svayaṁjyoti*[10]. *Māṇḍūkya* upaniṣad distinguishes three states of the self and calls them *Vaiśvānara*, *Taijasa* and *Prājña*[11]. The first is the waking self, having ten senses, five vital airs, *manas*, *buddhi*, *ahaṅkāra* and *citta*, the distinction between the last four not being very clear. This self is the enjoyer of gross objects and is the first part or *pāda* of *brahman*. *Taijasa* is the second *pāda*, it is the dreaming self. Waking experience stores impressions in the mind, which then appear as if they were external objects, but are in reality only pulsations of mind. Later Vedānta does not accept this idealistic account of the dream-contents but explains them as produced by *avidyā*. *Prājña*, the third *pāda* is the dreamless sleeper. Mind becomes dense here and ceases pulsating. Consciousness too becomes dense (*prajñānaghana*) or undifferentiated, like objects n darkness. Since there is no experience of pain, self is blissful here, but is not bliss itself as consciousness is still impure. Though not knowing anything in deep sleep, the nature of the self as the knower is not affected. It is still the knower of all objects in all times and is therefore called *prājña*.

Gauḍapāda elaborates on this three-fold distinction[12]. The self successively occupies the three positions, yet is independent of them all. The self is one, pure and unrelated. Its oneness is confirmed by the judgement of personal identity, "I am he". These three positions are really three states of embodi-

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ment of the self. Each of the three, viz. *Viśva* (or *Vaiśvānara*), *Taijasa* and *Prājña*, is the self, but only as embodied. The self in waking life can perceive objects, but it can also see mentally, by remembering or imagining them, or again by dreaming them. Thus the dreaming self is really not different from the waking self. When all imagery ceases and consciousness rests in itself (*ghanaprajña*), it is their knower as *prājña*. Mental operations all stop, only vital air (*prāṇa*) or embodiment persists, though only potentially (*prasava-bījātmaka*). The embodiment exists in an undifferentiated condition. Had the *prājña* self been bereft of this potentiality even, and thus had become free from embodiment, then there would have been no reawakening for it as 'I'. When embodiment ceases even potentially, *prājna* passes into *turīya*, the real unconditional nature of the self. The re-emergence of 'I' after deep sleep indicates the presence of embodiment in that state. All the states are different forms of the embodiment of the self. In itself it is *turīya*.

Gauḍapāda further explains the relation of embodiment to causality[13]. Causality governs the first two conditions both actually (the effect actually happens) and potentially (effect is only potentially present in the cause, in accordance with *satkāryavāda*). Causal potentiality consists of ignorance, or not knowing. Its actualization is knowing otherwise, positively mistaking. *Prājña* is affected by causation only in its potentiality (i.e. ignorance). *Turīya* is beyond all these.

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Prājña is not aware of itself[14], and also of others (as *viśva* and *taijasa* are), and is therefore covered by undifferentiated darkness of not knowing (*tattvāgrahaṇa*). Not knowing duality is a condition common to both *prājña* and *turīya*[15], but for opposite reasons. In one case duality is absorbed in the undifferentiated darkness or ignorance, which still contains it potentially. In the other case there is no darkness, no duality even potentially. The two cannot be equated. The dormant darkness (*bījanidrā*), which is present in *prājña*, does not affect *turīya*.

Sleep and *samādhi* (*suṣupti* and *manonirodha*) are thus not the same, notwithstanding the fact that absence of determinate knowledge is common to both. *Vāsanās* are still present in sleep, albeit implicitly, while in *samādhi* they have been completely destroyed.

The notion of *prājña* comes thus close to that of *sākṣī* as developed later. It is the self of dreamless sleep, covered by total undifferentiated darkness. It is different from the self of waking experiences. Senses do not function in sleep. The notion of 'I' is absent as explicit awareness but is still present potentially. It is only a state of self, not the real nature of the self. Sleep is not *samādhi*. The sleeper is not liberated.

The concept still remains however unclear. What is the relation between the three states ? What does the *prājña* do during waking life, and during dreaming ? Is it one in all sleepers, or different for different individuals. Gauḍapāda compounds the confusion by

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equating *sākṣī* with *Īśvara*[16]. There are two principles in the subject; one is associated with the body (*kṣetrajña*, *liṅgopādhi*), the enjoyer of pleasure and pain. The other is *Īśvara*, pure consciousness constituted by *sattva* alone (*sarvasattvopādhi*), the witness of both enjoyer and the enjoyed (*nityasākṣī*). It does not eat (i.e. enjoy) objects, but merely witnesses. Here may be found an anticipation of the later doctrine of *Īśvarasākṣī*, but it remains obscure. Pleasure and pain cannot be perceived by the *pramātā* but only by the *sākṣī*. The *pramātā* being imposed on the latter, appropriates these mental states as its own, stamps them with the notion of 'I'.

Kaṭha distinguishes between the pure self, which is not the enjoyer (*bhoktā*), and the self associated with the body, the senses and mind[17]. The latter is empirical (*saṁsārī*) while the pure self is of the nature of unchanging consciousness. It is beyond *buddhi* and is the witness of all (*sarvasākṣī*), the essence of all, i.e. is *brahman*. Here we find *sākṣī* equated with the supreme reality; how could it then be related to the empirical *bhoktā*? *Brahman* is *sarvasākṣī* or *sarvadṛk*[18] only in the sense that its nature as seer is not affected when there is nothing else to be seen. *Sākṣī* on the other hand is literally a seer; it is the witness of everything that appears.

Chāndogya stresses the continuity of the real self[19]. It is immortal (*amṛta*) in that it continues in all states: it sees through the eyes, is that which dreams without eyes, and is that which does not dream in deep sleep, during which the self itself is not

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absent. *Taittirīya* asserts that the self is not an object[20], nor a subject and object rolled into one. It is unitary awareness (*jñapti*) which is never sublated. *Praśna* gives an argument for the existence of the self[21]. The assertion that there are things is not possible without the assertion that there is consciousness. To say there is no consciousness is a contradiction in terms. The variable factor in experience must be contrasted against the invariable factor. Objects cannot exist without consciousness, which is never absent, not even in deep sleep where it is not manifest.

By far the most detailed analysis of knowing and its presuppositions is to be found in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka upaniṣad*. The self is not discovered by any empirical means of knowledge[22], and is therefore never objectified. What is known as an 'I' is an ascription. It is characterless, since all characters are objects of the self. Self is essentially *brahman*; agency, enjoyment, empiricality are all products of ignorance[23]. No distinction of individuality is possible at the level of pure self[24]. The sleeping self is constituted by pure consciousness (*vijñānamaya*)[25]. The vital airs (e.g. speech etc.) are all withdrawn, the specific state of the empirical self (*liṅgopādhi*) discarded, though individuality persists. The sleeper gives up its active function of seeing[26], and is like pure water, untainted and unrelated. It is defined by not knowing anything. Being the all-knower, it cannot be known in its own turn by something else (*vijñātāram are kena vijānīyāt*). Self is unconditionally immediate (*sākṣād*

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aparokṣa)[27], the underlying essence of all being (*sarvāntarātmā*). The seer of seeing is not seen (*na vijñāter vijñātāram vijānīyāḥ*)[28]. The self is the indwelling essence of the individual (*antaryāmī*)[29].

In a very characteristic passage, which essentially foreshadows the later account of *sākṣī*, self is described as *ātmajyoti*[30], and again as *svayaṁjyoti*[31]. The seer himself is unseen, the knower remains unknown, since there is no other knower apart from this. In waking life objects are illumined by light from external sources, like sun etc. But in dreams and deep sleep this source of illuminations is no longer available, and yet objects are revealed.Hence the real source of illumination, in all the states including that of waking, is something else. This illumination, where all extraneous sources fail, is that of the self itself (*ātmajyoti*). Self is that which is not illumined by anything else, but still illumines everything. In dreaming, the self forsakes everything else but creates objects of its own, enjoys bliss and pain and, as such, is self-luminous, shining in its own light (*svayaṁjyoti*). Just as a huge fish roams over both the banks of a river[32], self continues in all the three states, and is not therefore identical with any one of them. Waking state and dreams are both states of relatedness. Deep sleep however is characterized by unrelatedness (*asaṅga*) and is bliss (*samprasanna*). The ultimate self, being without a second, has no self-consciousness[33] or object-consciousness, though it is of the nature of consciousness itself. Intrinsically unrelated, it has to be related to an object in order that its selfluminosity

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becomes manifast. Lacking an object, its selfluminosity is not evident, as is the case in deep sleep. It is consciousness, but not consciousness of anything. In deep sleep this seer sees nothing[34], but there is still seeing; the seeing of the seer never goes (*na hi draṣṭur dṛṣṭer viparilopo vidyate*), being its own intrinsic nature, like the warmth of fire. Its seeing cannot be distinguished from not seeing since there is no other to be seen. Only when ignorance posits an other can the seeing function be empirically realized. When everything becomes the self there is nothing to be seen, and hence no seeing.

Śaṅkara, in his stupendous commentaries, takes over bodily the theory of self from the upaniṣads, seeking to give it a systematic and rationalistic rubric. The notion of what constitutes selfhood remains intact, and his main concern is to work out a full-fledged theory of *avidyā*, which is required to lend coherence to the diverse upaniṣadic teachings. He is pre-occupied with the problem of situating ignorance in a non-dualistic framework. Being a pioneering effort, the borderline between self as pure consciousness and the self associated with ignorance (i.e. *sākṣī*) is not made precise. Pure consciousness is sometimes described as *brahman*, sometimes as the witness-self (*sākṣī*) of deep sleep, sometimes as *Īśvara* even. The inwardness of the self (*pratyagātman* or *sarva-sākṣī*)[35] is a favourite topic of discussion for Śaṅkara. Bodily, sensuous, and internal qualities like in 'I am fat', 'I am dumb', 'I am miserable', etc. are falsely

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ascribed to the self, which is essentially self-evident witness-consciousness. But *pratyagātman* or *sarva-sākṣī* refer to the individual self (*jīva*) for Śaṅkara. *Bhāmatī* makes it clear by describing it as *antaḥ-karaṇāvacchinna*. The notion of a *sākṣī* as something much deeper than *jīvātman* is yet to emerge. Again, Śaṅkara refers[36] to the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* passage (3.7.9) where self (*puruṣa*) is described as *antaryāmī* which resides in *āditya* (*vijñānātman*) or the knower, but which the latter does not know. That *puruṣa* is *antaryāmī* or *Īśvara*. It is the same as the *sākṣī* of later Vedānta. It appears to be unconsciousness during deep sleep, but that is not because of the absence of consciousness, but because of lack of objects to be revealed. It is the light which is not manifested when there is no object for it to fall on[37] and be reflected. Self or *sākṣī* is not therefore discovered empirically, but by a regressive analysis as what is residual, or left over.[38] It is called *pratyagātman* because of its inwardness (*pratyaktva*). It knows everything, nothing remains unknown to it; it is therefore called *sarvajña*.[39] *Pratyagātman* is also equated with *Īśvara*.[40] It remains awake even while the sleeper sleeps and shows the dream contents created by *avidyā*. This ever wakeful spirit is the self.[41] Being continuous in all states it is immortal (*amṛta*). In itself it is unknowable; it is known only when it enters the *antaḥkaraṇa* which is like a cave.[42] *Antaḥkaraṇa* illumines what it is in contact with. *Brahman* therefore has to be embodied as *jīva* in order to be known.

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There can be no perceptual evidence for the self, since perception depends on objects, constituted by *upādhis*.[43] Self cannot be perceived (*na dṛṣter draṣṭāram paśyeḥ, vijñātāram are kena vijānīyāt, avijñātaṁ vijñātṛ* etc.). The self perceived in 'I'-consciousness is the limited self as reflected in conditions of intellect (*upādhis* of *buddhi*), e.g. the 'I' in judgements like 'I am happy'. Self is not really conditioned by the quality of happiness, since the latter is perceptible while the self is not. If happiness is an object, self too cannot be objectified, without ceasing to be the subject. The subject is essentially different from what it is the subject of. Self can be described as having qualities only in an ascriptive sense. It is the seer of seeing (*dṛṣter draṣṭā*), i.e. never bereft of its seeing function. Its seeing is timeless, suffering no break in its seeing, unlike the other kind of seeing of objects, which has gaps in between. Two kinds of seeing must be admitted, otherwise these gaps of not seeing cannot be accounted for. Real seeing is eternal (*nitya*), as evidenced by dream-experience, where ordinary seeing has ceased. This unceasing seeing (*dṛṣṭi*) is identical with selfhood, is always witnessing the other kind of transient *dṛṣṭi* from waking to dreaming. It is self-evident, identical with the seer. There is no other seer apart from this *dṛṣṭi*.

The two states of waking and sleeping are nevertheless not two distinct selves.[44] Nobody would say, "The waking animal is a cow; when asleep it is a horse". A thing never loses its intrinsic nature,

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does not become something else ; otherwise there would be an end of all significant discourse. Empirical seeing has the other kind of seeing as its background,[45] and when the latter is associated with such empirical seeing, the character of empiricality is ascribed to intrinsic seeing. Strictly speaking there is no not-seeing for the seer ; it is only transferred (*upacarita*). Intrinsic seeing being the ground of empirical seeing, cannot itself be seen by the latter, cannot be presented as an external object. Metaphorically, self can be said to exist in two worlds--mundane (*ihaloka*) and supramundane (*paraloka*),[46] i. e. waking and sleeping. Dreaming comes in between them, from which transition to both is possible. Lacking any external light, it then shines or reveals only by its own light. It creates a body for itself (*vāsanāmaya śarīra*) and enjoys pleasure and pain, due to past *vāsanās*. It is itself the light, the light which never goes out (*aluptadṛksvabhāva*). In dreaming self-luminosity of the self becomes transparent, like a sword unsheathed as it were.

In all this, we find a penetrating discussion of the nature of the self and its functioning. Śaṅkara leaves us in no doubt as to what he conceives to be the real nature of self. The same clarity does not percolate however to the discussion of the self as immanent within empirical experience. Much laxity pertains to the use of terms like *pratyagātman*, *sarvasākṣī*, *sarvajña*, *Īśvara*, even *ātman*. Their distinct nuances are not clarified. Terms like *brahman*, *sākṣī*, *Īśvara* are taken to be synonymous in many contexts.

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Even the *turīya* self is described as *sarvadṛk*.[47] How then is *prājña* only a condition of the self, while *turīya* is the self itself? Which is really the seer (*draṣṭā*)? To *antaryāmī* is also ascribed the function of controlling from within.[48] Is that also the function of *sākṣī*, the sleeping self? The *antaryāmī* is explicitly equated with *Iśvara*.[49] Elsewhere, its knowledge is said to be a *śakti* or *upādhi* (*jñānaśakti*)[50] as distinct from being identical with knowledge. The same description is applied, both to the ultimate self, as also to the sleeping self.[51] How then to distinguish between them, distinguish at all between being asleep and being liberated. It is plausible to suppose that sleep is being offered as an exemplar of *mukti*, but the transition is not made clear.

Even in *Pañcapādikā*, the concepts are still to be crystallized. The *sākṣī* is the 'I'.[52] 'I' is self-evident (*svayaṁprakāśa*). This 'I' is also the first ascription.[53] But then the *sākṣī* as 'I' would also be merely an ascription; what happens then to the upaniṣadic texts declaring *sākṣī* to be the ultimate self? The 'I' is further both the subject and object. It is self-luminons (*svayaṁprakāśa*),[54] not revealed in the revelation of the object. I-consciousness continues in deep sleep too, but its revelation is obscured by ignorance. Self in deep sleep is not the *pramātā*, since there is no appropriation by the 'I' of the body, the senses etc.[55] Pure self, being unrelated, cannot be the *pramātā*.[56]

Though some looseness of usage remains in the *Bhāṣya Vārttika* (e.g. the statement that *sākṣī* is

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brahman[57]), it is abundantly clear that the discussion is much more technical, elaborate and lucid, but unfortunately in a highly verbose and unsystematic fashion. The salient features of the conceptual geography are clearly brought out, and certain distinctions are sharpened. The notion of a *vṛtti* is clarified, and its relationship to consciousness explained.

There are two factors in the knowlecge-situation viz. the variable and the invariable.[58] Though the contents of knowledge vary, their knower remains invariable. *Pramātā*, *prameya*, *pramāṇa* etc. are all imposed on the self.[59] Self is the witness of their coming and going; *pramātā* etc. are not invariable, but they come and go. They are not therefore essential to the self,[60] as wearing an ornament is not integral to the person wearing it. Or again, to vary the metaphor,[61] a man on the boat in the stream cannot perceive the motion of the boat, but only the man standing on the shore, so also if the self or *sākṣī* were not different from the *buddhi-vṛttis*, it could not perceive the latter. The essential self is invariable.

All empirical knowing (*dṛṣṭi*) is mediated by *vṛttis*.[62] *Vṛtti* is something inert (*jaḍa*).[63] It is still called 'seeing' (*dṛṣṭi*) because of the reflection of consciousness or self in it. It appears to function like consciousness[64] which, being all-pervasive, pervades all 'seeing'.[65] *Vṛttis* cannot exist without consciousness. Just as it is associated with *avidyā*, being its evolute, it is also associated with consciousness as its reflection (*cidābhāsa*), without which there is no *vṛtti*. A *vṛtti* as such, being inert, would not reveal anything.[66]

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Even *avidyā* itself is revealed through a *vṛtti*, resulting in the knowledge 'I am ignorant'.[67] Without a *vṛtti* nothing would be revealed, everything would be dark, since consciousness itself, being neutral (*kūṭastha*), would not reveal anything.[68]

All knowledge, even the knowledge of not knowing, viz. 'I do not know', is made possible by the underlying principle which always knows.[69] The judgement 'I did not know' is not memory. *Buddhi* is dissolved in deep sleep ; body, though present, is inert—a stone has no memory. Without *sākṣī* even *abhāva* cannot be witnessed.[70] This is an overstatement, since *abhāva* is not directly presented to *sākṣī*, but known only through the *pramāṇa* of *anupalabdhi*. *Sākṣī* does not know through any *pramāṇa*. *Ajñāna* is not *abhāva*.[71] A still more glaring overstatement is made,[72] when, apart from *abhāva*, doubt, falsity, certainty etc. are said to be distinguished by the real self. These are all possible only by *vṛttijñāna*.

Sākṣī is the real self, different from *pramātā*, *buddhi*, senses and the body. In dreams the body does not function, and yet they are witnessed by consciousness, hence consciousness is not the body.[73] Body, mind etc. are as much objects of consciousness as the pot is.[74] *Pramātā* is the 'I' that pervades the various *vṛttis*,[75] and is thus not continuous. *Sākṣī* is the seer of this seer (*draṣṭā*) or *pramātā*,[76] seer of the latter's seeing, seer of the objects seen, of dream-objects, even of the absence of all these in deep sleep. When senses go to sleep, something remains awake, which witnesses the dream-contents projected by the

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vṛtti of *avidyā*.[77] It sees even in sleeping, since its seeing never goes out.[78] Sleep is the retracting of all *vāsanās* of waking life and it is only then that the real nature of the self as self-evident (*svaprabhatā*) is revealed.[79] In waking life its self-luminosity is not distinguishable from *buddhi*, senses, light etc.[80] Nor in deep sleep is any distinction possible, since there is nothing to illumine. Only in dreams is it

ible, lacking as this experience does any other kind of light.

In empirical discourse the term 'self' is ambiguous. It may refer to the body, to subtle body, to *antaryāmī* or *sākṣī*, or again to the negation of all these (*neti neti*).[81] Of all these the real self can be only what is universal.[82] It is the *sākṣī* alone that is the real self which knows always. Not being an object, it cannot be pointed out by means of a *pramāṇa*.[83] Nor can it be witnessed by something else.[84] It witnesses birth and death both, and has therefore neither.[85] A *vṛtti* knows an object, but not the *sākṣī*.[86] *Sākṣī* is the object of nothing.[87] Objects are known by *pramāṇas; pramāṇas* presuppose the self and cannot therefore prove the latter. Self could only be self-evident. It is still not unreal like the hare's horns, since it is immediate (*ananyānubhava*)[88].

The *sākṣī*-consciousness is invariably associated with ignorance. Pure consciousness becomes *sākṣī* due to *ajñāna*.[89] It is significant only in relation to objects to be witnessed (*sākṣya*). Though consciousness is supremely evident, its evidence is covered and it appears to be obscure, when shrouded by *avidyā*.[90]

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Its being the witness (*sākṣitā*) does not intrinsically belong to it.[91] *Vṛttis* are only imagined in the unchanging *sākṣī*-consciousness. Right knowledge dispels both *sākṣitva* as well as *sākṣyatva*.[92] *Sākṣī* itself cannot be called the 'seer' without the *vṛttis*, since there is nothing to be seen in deep sleep. Strictly speaking there is no seer at all. It is still called the 'seer', since its seeing (*dṛṣṭi*) or consciousness does not go. There is, literally, no agent of seeing (*kartā*). It is the agent by ascription.[93]

Seeing is an act, but *sākṣī* has no activity.[94] Its being the seer (*sākṣitva*) lies in its pervadingness. Seeing is appropriate only in the case of *vṛttis*; it is yet called seeing by ascription (*lakṣanā*). Self does not really do anything; it can yet reveal, like the sun, which has no 'illuminating activity', illumines or heats objects, by its mere presence.[95]

There are many individuals (*pramātā*), since their mutual difference is witnessed by *sākṣī*. But in the case of *sākṣī* this difference is unassertible. If the *sākṣī* too were to be different for different individuals, who would bear witness to this difference ?[96] Difference or negation belongs only to a cause or an effect. Self is neither, being the pure unrelated consciousness. Hence there can be only one *sākṣī*.[97] This universal nature of the self is experienced by everybody in deep sleep;[98] the sleeper ceases to be an individual.

It is in the *Pañcapādikā-vivaraṇa* that important theoretical issues are raised for the first time. The questions that Śaṅkara slurs over are made explicit,

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and are subjected to a trenchant analysis. The treatment is always original ; many original arguments are formulated which are repeated in all subsequent texts, and the Advaita epistemology can be said to have arrived at its definitive shape.

All knowledge takes place by destroying the previous unknownness of the object.[99] Revelation of the object is not adding anything to it, but only removing the covering.[100] Consciousness is inherently universal, but its revelation is arrested because of covering (*āvaraṇa*) and therefore no knowledge takes place.[101] Consciousness by itself does not amount to knowing an object, but it becomes a knower only when it is associated with egoity (*ahaṅkāra*).[102] When the covering is partially removed by *antaḥkaraṇa,* knowledge takes place to that extent.[103]

But how can ignorance reside in consciousness ? Consciousness is not antithetical to *ajñāna,* since the latter is its own object.[104] Knownness of the object depends on a *pramāṇa.* Ignorance as such is coexistent with consciousness.[105] *Sākṣī* knows its own *ajñāna,* and there is no incompatibility between the two.[106] The *sākṣī*-consciousness is self-revealed, otherwise the whole world would remain unrevealed.[107] Its revelation is timelessly present, the variations in knowledge being due to the modification of *antaḥkaraṇa as* 'I'.[108] *Sākṣī* is uncovered (*anāvṛta*); everything is revealed always.[109] Everything, known or unknown, is the object of *sākṣī.* The unknown too, in some way or other, is revealed by *sākṣī.*[110] Knowing something is not possible without having

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known its previous unknownness.[111] The illusory is never covered or unrevealed. Covering exists only for *pramāṇajñāna* which destroys it. But the illusory is not an object of *pramāṇajñāna*, because there is no covering or previous unknownness for it. And there can be no *pramāṇa* for the covering itself, which stands eternally revealed.[112] *Avidyā* cannot hide anything from the *sākṣī*.[113] The function of revelation is present even in waking experience, but is obscured, like the obscured lamp-light in strong breeze. In deep sleep, this function is undisputed ; *ajñāna* is directly experienced.[114] In illusion, *avidyā* is transformed in a two-fold way, viz. as the objective silver, and as the apparent knowledge of that silver. Both are objects of *sākṣī*.[115] In deep sleep there is not even the 'I'-consciousness. Its experience of happiness is simply that of absence of pain. Happiness in sleep is not a *vṛtti*, but is identical with consciousness itself.[116] The three states of waking, dreaming etc. do not have independent *upādhis*, or different persons would have been involved in different states.[117] Each grosser state is an *upādhi* to its previous subtler state. Even in the deepest sleep, *ajñāna* is revealed, and the distinction between *jīva* and *brahman* remains.[118]

Sākṣī thus means the unrelated and unchanging.[119] Mind or intellect (*antaḥkaraṇa*) is directly known by *sākṣī*, and is not the object of any *pramāṇa*.[120] The known and the unknown, the real and the unreal are equally objects of *sākṣī*-consciousness.[121]

A semi-popular paraphrase of the essentials of Advaita epistemology from the *Vivaraṇa* standpoint

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is found in the *Pañcadaśī*. Eschewing all technical discussion, it contains a wealth of material elucidating the notion of selfhood. But since the *sākṣī* occupies a borderline position between ultimate consciousness and ignorance, between reality and falsity, the concept remains rather nebulous and difficult to grasp for the layman for whom the work is primarily intended. The term '*sākṣī*' is not employed, *kūṭastha* being favoured instead, though there is some doubt if the two terms are synonymous.[122] In any case there is much looseness in the usage of the term. On the one hand the witness-consciousness is equated with *brahman*;[123] even the 'I' is said to be *brahman*,[124] though the *kūṭastha* is also denied to be the 'I'.[125] *Sākṣī* is also identified with *Īśvara*,[126] but again the four forms of consciousness, viz. *kūṭastha*, *brahman*, *jīva* and *Īśvara* are carefully distinguished.[127] All this laxity however could only be attributed to its not being a technical work, and does not take anything away from the immense value of the elucidations given. The treatment is more heuristic than academic.

Consciousness is what remains constant while objects vary.[128] Dream contents are different from those of waking life, while consciousness remains the same.[129] It is thus different from both. Everything is an object of consciousness, but it is itself not the object of another consciousness. It is therefore unknown, not because it does not exist, but because it cannot be objectified.[130] It is not something that can be apprehended; it is what remains when all apprehending ceases.[131] There is no *pramāṇa* for conscious-

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ness, since it is self-evident.[132] Though unknown by another, its existence is undeniable. Denial of awareness presupposes that very awareness; the denial is like saying 'I cannot speak'.[133] It cannot however be demonstrated as "this". Its non-demonstrability itself is its essential nature.[134] If objects are present, it reveals them. If these are absent, it is self-luminous or self-evident.[135] It is like the lamp which reveals everything while itself remaining stationary.[136]

Consciousness reveals, not merely objects, but also their knownness. Consciousness of the form of a pot can reveal only that pot. The knownness of the pot is revealed only by pure consciousness (*kūṭastha*).[137] The reflection of consciousness in *buddhi* (*jīva* or *cidābhāsa*) is exhausted only in producing knowability of the object. The final knowing is that of *kūṭastha*.[138] *Buddhi* or intellect cannot by itself generate knownness, being inert like earth.[139] Knownness cannot be function of pure consciousness either, since that is available even prior to knowledge.[140] Knownness is thus produced by *cidābhāsa*, which is again illumined by pure consciousness.[141] There is thus a two-fold knownness, one by *jīva*, the other by *kūṭastha*.[142] The two knowledges in question are (a) 'This is a pot'; (b) 'The pot is known'. First is that of *cidābhāsa*, the second that of *kūṭastha*.[143]

Unknownness too is an object of awareness.[144] On waking up, one becomes aware of the absence of knowledge during sleep. Even prior to knownness, the object is revealed as unknown.[145] *Kūṭastha* thus knows the unknownness as well as the knownness of

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the object.[146] Being the witness of *vṛtti*, awareness is also present in the prior absence (*prāgabhāva*) of the *vṛtti*. It is thus that it can have the consciousness 'I am ignorant'. The emergence of a *vṛtti* destroys that ignorance.[147] Not knowing an objct is not the negation of that object. It is only the conscious realization of falsity that can negate. Otherwise one would effortlessly deny objects and attain *mukti* while asleep or unconscious.[148]

What then is the nature of pure consciousness as *sākṣī* (*kūṭastha*) ? It is that which remains self-identical in all the three states (waking etc.), which resides in the two bodies, gross and subtle, but without undergoing any modifications.[149] It is the ground which underlies the illusion of egoity along with its body, senses etc.[150] *Avidyā* has the twin functions of obscuring and projecting: it obscures the *kūṭastha* while projecting the *jīva*.[151] Being obscured, its intrinsic characteristics like unrelatedness, blissfulness etc. remain hidden.[152] 'I' itself is not the nature of *kūṭastha*, but is only imposed on it.[153] We make a distinction between 'I', 'you' and the self, as when we say 'I myself', 'you yourself'. Selfhood is thus the generic form of subjects, just as 'thisness' is that of objects. It is this selfhood (*svatva*) that is *kūṭastha*.[154] *Svatva* and *ātmatva* are synonymous.[155] It is not apprehended in isolation, since *jīvatva* is imposed on it, and it remains hidden.[156] The *jīva* never distinguishes the *kūṭastha;* that is its timeless ignorance.[157] *Kūṭastha* cannot make any distinction; distinctions are all made by the *buddhi*, and are only ascribed.[158]

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The distinction between the external and the internal is due to the body, and does not exist for the *kūṭastha*. The external is what is outside the body, while the internal is what is inside[159].

Jīva or the empirical self is the totality of three factors ; consciousness, subtle body (*liṅga śarīra*), and the reflection of consciousness in that body.[160] Such a reflected consciousness also takes upon itself the notion of 'I' and being in the world (*saṁsārin*).[161] That is to say, the *jīva* is both consciousness and its embodiment as an 'I'. The latter demands, in addition to reflection in the intellect (*buddhi*), also the assumption of two kinds of bodies. Pure consciousness as reflected in *buddhi*, i.e. the *jīva*, is called a person or individual (*puruṣa*), which is neither pure consciousness (*kūṭastha*) nor mere reflection (*cidābhāsa*), but both.[162] *Jīva* or *cidābhāsa* is the reflection of *kūṭastha*. It is the latter which illumines the body, but its reflection takes over that function, as a mirror does to the original source of light.[163] When it rejects its two bodies, and identifies itself with its ground (*kūṭastha*), it has the 'I'-consciousness of being one with the ground. Then the judgement 'I am pure consciousness' is made possible, only by rejecting the initial, embodied 'I'.[164] The 'I' has thus different senses, one primary and two secondary. Pure consciousness is not the primary referent of 'I', which primarily means *jīva* or reflection of *kūṭastha*, not the *kūṭastha* itself. Secondary meanings of 'I' are two : when *kūṭastha* and its reflection (*ābhāsa*) are discriminated, each of these two may be called 'I', since the first

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primary 'I' was founded on their non-discrimination. It is only in this secondary sense that *kūṭastha* may be called 'I'.[165] Ultimately even the knowledge 'I am *kūṭastha*' is false (*mithyā*), since the 'I' part came from its association with reflected consciousness (*cidābhāsa*) or embodied *jīva*, and it is then transferred to the ground. In itself *kūṭastha* is not the 'I'.[166] The consciousness of 'I', along with that of mental states, like desire, anger etc. is pervaded by *cidābhāsa* or *jīva*, as iron is by fire.[167] *Cidābhāsa* is like *kūṭastha*, though not essentially the same. The reflection has relatedness and modifiability, while illumination remains constant.[168]

The intellect (*buddhi*) goes out with the help of the senses, and this activity is wrongly ascribed to the *kūṭastha*, like the steady rays of the sun, when entering through a chink in the window, appear to dance.[169] The activity of going out and seeking objects is really the function of *buddhi*, but is ascribed to the inactive *kūṭastha*. The latter continues where *buddhi* ceases to function. In itself it is beyond *buddhi* and speech[170]. A *buddhivṛtti* or modification of the intellect, can reveal only itself, not anything else, even along with reflected consciousness, while, when bereft of that reflection, it can reveal nothing, being inert (*jaḍa*).[171] All *vṛttis* disappear in sleep, unconsciousness and *samādhi*.[172] All *vṛttis*, even the absence of them, are revealed by the unmodifiable *kūṭastha* consciousness[173]. The *vṛttis* of the waking life and the dream world are however present in a latent form in deep sleep, as seeds of a tree. The

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vāsanā of the whole world is present, though gross objects are not.[174] Bliss and ignorance are however directly revealed in deep sleep. The waking judgement 'I slept happily and did not know anything' indicates presence of bliss and ignorance in sleep.[175] Memory presupposes actual experience, hence direct seeing by consciousness of bliss and ignorance has to be postulated.[176] Sleep and ignorance are really the same; it is pure ignorance into which everything is merged.[177]

Vedāntaparibhāṣā is a short manual of Advaita epistemology, but its small size does not detract from the value of some very important explanations it contains. It is illuminating at many focal points, and makes certain fine distinctions. The confusion between *sākṣī* and *Iśvara* is finally laid to rest, and a further refinement is introduced by distinguishing *Iśvara* from *Iśvara-sākṣī*. The discussion is critical throughout. The role of a *vṛtti* in generating knowledge is prominently brought out.

Jīva and *sākṣī* are both forms of consciousness, but qualified in different ways.[178] *Jīva* is that consciousness which is essentially tied to the intellect (*antaḥkaraṇāvacchinna caitanya*), while the *sākṣī* consciousness is only loosely associated to the intellect (*antaḥkaraṇopahita*). An *avacchedaka* and an *upādhi* are both adjectival (*viśeṣaṇa*) but while the *avacchedaka* is essentially tied to its term, an *upādhi* is some thing non-essential, not affecting the nature of the term it qualifies. The intellect is by itself inert

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(*jaḍa*) and cannot reveal.[179] Hence it acts as an auxiliary (*upādhi*) to *sākṣī* which reveals with the help of it. The intellects being many, there are as many *jīvasākṣīs* as there are *jīvas*. *Jīvasākṣī* is to be distinguished from *Īśvarasākṣī*, which is associated with cosmic creativity (*māyopahita caitanya*) and is one.[180] *Īśvara*, on the other hand, contains *māyā* as its necessary adjunct (*māyāvacchinna*). *Īśvara* and *Īśvarasākṣī* are essentially one, the difference being only as to how *māyā* qualifies them.

Nothing is known without a *vṛtti*. To be an object of *sākṣī* is not to be known without a *vṛtti*, but rather, to be known without a *pramāṇa*.[181] There are two kinds of *vṛttis*, viz. *antaḥkaraṇa vṛtti* and *avidyā vṛtti* The first corresponds to the I-consciousness, while the illusory silver is an *avidyāvṛtti*. The illusory is imposed on the object–consciousness (*viṣayacaitanya*), but since this is essentially identical with *sākṣī*-consciousness, the illusory is at the same time imposed on the *sākṣī* too.[182] So it is revealed only by *sākṣī*, and hence it is not revealed to some other person, i.e. some other *sākṣī*. So also the internal states of happiness etc. are directly revealed to the particular *sākṣī* concerned.

Though imposed on the *sākṣī*, the illusory does not generate an identity judgement 'I am silver', as we have 'I am happy' in the case of the internal states.[183] *Sukha* etc. are not the products of ignorance residing in *pramātā*, but of that in the *sākṣī* directly. The illusory silver partakes of the character

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of 'thisness' and is, as such, produced by the ignorance of *pramātā*. 'Thisness' belongs to object-consciousness (*viṣayacaitanya*) which again is identical with subject-consciousness (*pramātṛcaitanya*).[184]

It might be thought that no *avidyāvṛtti* is required for the knowledge of the *sākṣī*, since the illusory is revealed to it directly.[185] Immediacy however depends on identity, or rather lack of difference, of the objects with the consciousness cognizing it. As the *sākṣī*-consciousness does not appear to be identical with the illusory silver, the identity between them has to be established by means of a *vṛtti*.

Sākṣī knows thus everything, the real as well as the unreal.[186] Its knowledge is thus beyond validity, neither valid nor invalid. These distinctions are relevant only to the knowledge of the *pramātā*.

The great work, *Advaitasiddhi*, is the hall-mark of excellence in Advaita literature. The work is not very original; by the time it came to be written, the creative period of Advaita was almost over, and most of the doctrines were already well settled and the different schools of Advaita well established. *Advaita-siddhi* gathers them all together and presents them in a systematic manner without taking sides, explaining and justifying the various shades of opinion within the Advaitic fold. The work represents, in many respects, the last word of Advaita. The discussion always takes place at a high level, facilitated by the use of a precise technical idiom, precluding looseness of any kind.

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The self is not the 'I'. 'I' always refers to the not-self. Even the self, to the extent that it is referred to as an 'I', is really not-self. 'I' -ness is not intrinsic to it.[187] The referent of *ahaṅkāra* is neither pure self nor not-self, but a blend of both.[188] For pure self or consciousness there is no ignorance, and hence there is no knowing of it. *Avidyā* is known by the *sākṣī*-consciousness ;[189] it is directly known, in itself (*svarūpa*).[190] *Sākṣī* is that consciousness which is reflected in *avidyāvṛtti*. Like an eclipsed sun, *avidyā* is revealed by that consciousness which it covers.[191] A *vṛtti* of *avidyā* is not known by another *vṛtti*, or there would be an infinite regress. Ignorance is established by *pramāṇas*, is therefore not nothing (*asat*). It is indeterminate (*anirvacanīya*). It is not absence of knowledge. Absence (*abhāva*) is not known by the *sākṣī* but through the *pramāṇa* of *anupalabdhi*.[192] *Abhāva* is not directly presented to *sākṣī*.[193] But *ajñāna* is positive (*bhāvarūpa*). Pure consciousness is not opposed to *ajñāna*, which can therefore be revealed by it. What dispels *ajñāna* is consciousness reflected in a *vṛtti* of *antaḥkaraṇa*.[194] The knowledge of ignorance, of the form 'I do not know' is made possible by the identification of *pramātā* with *sākṣī*[195]. It is the *sākṣī* that sees the *ajñāna* while the *pramātā* has the notion of 'I'. I-consciousness is due to *avidyāvṛtti*, not antipodal to *ajñāna*, and does not therefore dispel it.[196] Only a *pramāṇavṛtti* destroys it ; 'I' (*jīva*) however is the content of *avidyā*.

There is no 'I' in deep sleep ;[197] I-consciousness arises only as modified by mental states, which latter

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are absent in sleep. 'I slept well' is a knowledge of *pramātā*, which is associated with the pure consciousness of sleep. 'I' itself is absent in sleep. The memory of sleep belongs to *pramātā* which is *antaḥkaraṇaviśiṣṭa*, not to *sākṣī* which is pure (*niṣkalaṅka*), though it is not really pure but *ajñānopahita*.[198] On waking, there is no confusion about one's own identity, since the 'I', latent in sleep, is again imposed on pure consciousness. Even during sleep everything is present in latent or potential form.[199]

The mental states like happiness etc. and the illusory are never covered by ignorance. These cannot exist as unknown. As long as they exist, they can do so only as revealed,[200] and hence there is no question of knowing them through dispelling their covering of ignorance as is the case with a *vṛtti*. The person who has happiness has no ignorance about it. There can be ignorance about the happiness of another person, but that is really due to the ignorance of *pramātā*.[201] Happiness of one person is as much a remote object for another as any other object,[202] and is to be known by the *pramātā* through a *vṛtti*, i.e. by dispelling the ignorance about it. So also is the case with the illusory. It consists of two parts, viz. the 'this' aspect and what is imposed (*adhyasta*) on it as appearance. The 'this' part is known by the *pramātā* through an *antaḥkaraṇa vṛtti* as usual, while the appearance is known by *avidyāvṛtti*.[203] The two *vṛttis* are not merely not distinguished, as in *akhyāti*, but there is a positive identification. Revelation

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itself is not a *vṛtti*, not even *avidyāvṛtti*, but consciousness itself.[204]

A lesser work by the same author is *Siddhāntabindu*, not cluttered with technical jargon, and consequently not so terse. Certain scholastic refinements are elaborated, refinements which are characteristic of later Advaita, not to be found in the early literature—questions like oneness or manyness of *sākṣī*,[205] the position of *sākṣī* vis-a-vis *Īśvara*[206], distinction between the Advaita and Śūnyavāda positions,[207] a fine analysis of dream experience.[208] It can be seen that the central arguments are reaching their final and definitive shape and any further elaboration could only result in scholastic logic-chopping.

There are two basic categories involved in knowledge, viz. the seer and the seen (*dṛk* and *dṛśya*).[209] The seer is pure consciousness or self; it is one, but is differentiated into three by *upādhis*, viz. *Īśvara*, *jīva* and *sākṣī*. *Īśvara* has *ajñāna* as its *upādhi*, while *jīva* is circumscribed by the intellect (*antaḥkarṇāvacchinna*). *Sākṣī* may be taken either as the original consciousness of which *Īśvara* is the reflection in *avidyā*, or, in case *Īśvara* is taken to be the original, then *sākṣī* may be taken as the principle of underlying continuity of *Īśvara* and *jīva*. *Vārttika* takes *Īśvara* and *sākṣī* to be the same, appearing in two different ways (i.e. *Īśvarasākṣī* and *jīvasākṣī*);[210] there is only one *sākṣī* in both which is itself not differentiated[211]; even in empirical discourse (*vyavahāra*) there is only one *sākṣī*.[212]

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Jīva exists in the three states of waking, dreaming and dreamless sleep and is called *viśva, taijasa* and *prājña* respectively.[213] *Sākṣī* is beyond all the three but underlies them all, and is *turīya*. *Jīva* can appear in different ways, because of different *upādhis*, but *sākṣī* is always one. All the three states are created by *avidyā* and are false. *Sākṣī* is the absolutely pure consciousness of *turīya* of the form "I (sic !) am".[214] While all the three states are unreal, their witness is not.[215]

The 'I', situated in associated contexts and associated with utterances like 'I am a man', 'I am an agent', is not the self.[216] The changing is necessarily the not-self. Nor can it be its own subject, as the two functions of subject and object are incompatible. Self is not to be known by anything else, or there would be an infinite series of subjects.[217]

How can the self be continuous or be identical with consciousness, since consciousness is absent during sleep ? Being the knower of the sleeping state too, it cannot be then absent. Knowledge of course may come and go, but the *sākṣī* reveals them all, both while they are present and also in their absence.[218] *Pramātā* too is changing and therefore cannot be real knower ; the changing cannot know itself as changing. So even *pramātā* is an object of *sākṣī*-consciousness, which is the ultimate subject.

Self is the knower of ignorance[219]; *ajñāna* is *sākṣipratītisiddha*.[220] 'I did not know anything': this is the consciousness of pure ignorance, but only as the cause, in sleep. Though no determinate objects

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are seen, still three *avidyāvṛttis* function in sleep; relating to the *sākṣī* (*sākṣyākāra*), relating to bliss (*sukhākāra*), and also to lack of particular knowledges in the sleep-state.[221] Had these *vṛttis* not been there, then one could not have the memory judgement 'I did not know' of these *vṛttis* on waking up. Intellect (*antaḥkarṇa*) is not essential for memory. Just as in a mirror the image of a face gets fused with that of the colour of a flower, and the composite judgement 'the face is red' is formed, so also two things are reflected together in *sāksī* viz. 'I' and a memory, so that the judgement, 'I slept well' is made possible. Of these two, memory, like illusion, is based on *sākṣī*; 'I' however is the base of *pramāṇajñāna*, i.e. comes from *pramātā*.[222]

There are two kinds of covering (*āvaraṇa*),[223] one pertaining to the subject and the other, to the object. Both are exemplified in the judgement 'I do not know the pot'. The first is removed by any kind of knowledge whatsoever, immediate or mediate. The second (object-ignorance) is removable only by an immediate knowledge (*pratyakṣa*).

The state of deep sleep (*suṣupti*) is not one of a mere blank (*śūnyatā*). Were it so, self-identity would be lost, and the sleeper would not wake up as identical. The self has no gap or break.[224] The sleeping self is also the enjoyer (*prājña*).[225] There is no absence of individuality (*jīvabhāva*) though the *antaḥkaraṇa* has lapsed, since its impressions (*saṁskāras*) persist. *Prājña* is not to be equated with *Īśvara*. Identification with *Īśvara* is only metaphorical, as in *suṣupti*

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there is appropriation of the body, senses etc. Though the sleeping self is one for everybody, yet different impressions of different persons can exist in it without incompatibility, as these exist only potentially. One can contain the many potentially. When the egos are reactivated on waking, the different *pramātās* take over. *Vārttika* holds that even in waking life there is only one *sākṣī*.[226]

Sākṣī-consciousness is described in the texts as omniscient (*sarvajña*), but this is again figurative language. It is omniscient only in the sense that it is capable of revealing everything. *Jīva*, lacking as it does this capacity of revelation, is therefore not omniscient.[227]

Consciousness is also of the nature of bliss,[228] hence there is no question of there being pain in deep sleep. By nature self is *sukhasvarūpa*.[229]

Dreams differ from dreamless sleep in that in the latter the *antaḥkaraṇa* is completely submerged in *avidyā*. Otherwise they are the same state, both to be known by the *sākṣī*. In waking life another factor, viz. *pramāṇajñāna*, comes into play. Ignorance with regard to a particular object cannot go without a *pramāṇavṛtti*.[230]

Dream-experience is apprehension of objects while the external senses cease functioning. One view is that the mind itself is transformed into the dream-contents, while others hold that *avidyā* is so transformed. In any case the contents are known by means of *avidyāvṛtti*. Dream-consciousness is not

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pramātā, which is associated with *antaḥkaraṇa*, and which has *vṛttis*. In dream, though *antaḥkaraṇa* is present, there is no *antaḥkaraṇa vṛtti*,[231] and hence, no *pramātā*.

The ground (*adhiṣṭhāna*) in dream can be either *jīva* or *brahman*. The latter opinion is ruled out since there is no *brahmajñāṇa* on waking up. When an illusion is sublated, its ground is revealed. Lacking *brahmajñāna*, dreams cannot be cancelled either. In case *brahmajñāna* is there, they would be eternally cancelled, and there would be *mukti*, not merely waking up from a dream.[232] Or alternatively, one could say that dreams are not really cancelled by *brahmajñāna*, but one illusion (dream) is merely supplanted by another illusion (waking state), without the ground (*adhiṣṭhāna*), i.e. *brahman*, being known. Illusion of waking removes that of dreaming.[233]

Against the other view that *jīva* ((*antaḥkaraṇā vacchinna caitanya*) is the ground of dream-experience the objection may be raised that, in that case, the form of a judgement in dreams should be, e.g. 'I am an elephant', instead of 'This is an elephant'. This is what happens in the parallel illusion of shell-silver: shell is the ground, with which the illusory silver is identified, in the judgement 'This is silver'. In case pure consciousness, or *sākṣī*, is supposed to be the ground and not the *jīva*, then the form of the resultant judgement should be 'Elephant is', and not 'This is elephant'.[234]

These objections may be countered. If *jīva* is supposed to be the ground then, again, we look to the

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parallel illusion of shell-silver and we find that silver is not identified with shell and the judgement is not 'The shell is silver'. Shell is suppressed while silver is seen. Similarly, *ahaṅkāra* is not seen along with the illusory elephant, so the judgement 'I am elephant' is not possible. The knowledge of 'I' as the ground would on the contrary dispel the illusion, just as knowledge of shell dispels the silver illusion.[235]

If *sākṣī* or pure consciousness were taken as the ground, then 'I am elephant' and 'This is elephant' are equally imaginary. 'I', 'this' 'elephant,' are all equally unreal. 'Thisness' is unreal even in waking life; everything in the context of illusion is illusory.[236] This position is still not that of *Śūnyavāda*, since the *adhiṣṭhāna* as pure consciousness is not denied. The reality of 'thisness' is not required in order to explain illusion, but only that of the ground, which is consciousness, or in the case of the silver illusion, that of the shell which itself remains unknown. Similar is the case of the dream-illusion, where *sākṣi-caitanya* is the hidden ground, while 'This is elephant' is projected instead.[237]

Siddhāntaleśasaṅgraha is a useful compendium of several schools of Advaitic thought, though the listing is neither systematic nor comprehensive. Opinions are catalogued without going into their basis, so that the work reads as a string of names. It is invaluable however in preserving many shades of thought which, not having succeeded in entering the mainstream of Advaita orthodoxy, would have been lost to posterity, but for their being recorded in this text. Many

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subtle controversies and differences of opinion are mentioned, which otherwise would have remained unknown.

Pure consciousness can have four forms,[238] due to different kinds of *upādhi*: (1) *Paramātman*, which is pure, not tainted by *māyā* or its effects; (2) *Īśvara*, being associated with *māyā*; (3) *Hiraṇyagarbha*, which has as its subtle body all the effects of *māyā*, but only in an unmanifest form (not *pañcīkṛta*); and lastly (4) *Virāṭ*, which has as its gross body all the effects fully manifested. *Jīva* is an embodied entity superimposed on *paramātman*, and thus partaking of the character of the latter as consciousness.

This is however the objective classification (*ādhidaivata*) of forms of consciousness. Subjectively (*adhyātma*) again it has three forms, viz. *viśva*, *taijasa* and *prājña*[239]. *Prājña* is the witness of pure ignorance, when *antaḥkaraṇa* has lapsed during sleep. It is also of the nature of bliss. *Taijasa* is the dream-consciousness, having a subtle body. *Viśva* is waking consciousness, having gross body.

The relation between *Jīva* and *Īśvara* can be looked at from different angles. One view is that consciousness as reflected in *māyā* which has the function of projection (*vikṣepa*) only, is *Īśvara*. *Jīva* is consciousness reflected in *avidyā*, having both the functions of covering (*āvaraṇa*) and projection (*vikṣepa*).[240] Another view is that *māyā* is constituted by pure *sattva*, while *avidyā* is affected by *rajas* and *tamas* as well.[241] Another way of making the distinction is

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to say that *Īśvara* is associated with the cause (*kāraṇopādhi*) while *jīva*, with the effect (*kāryopādhi*).[242]

Jīva is of the nature of 'I' and this 'I'-ness is ascribed to the neutral (*kūṭastha*) consciousness[243]. Hence both the properties, of the ground (*kūṭastha*) as well as that of the superimposed ('I'), are flashed together. 'I'-ness and selfhood both operate together, as in the judgment 'I myself am doing it'. Selfhood is universal, as evinced in the phrases 'I myself', 'you yourself', 'he himself' etc. The 'I' however is only a particular ascription on selfhood.

Ignorance or covering is of two kinds[244]. One that resides in the object and produces the ascription (*vikṣepa*), the other in the *sākṣī*, and is of the form 'I do not know this'. This type of covering does not produce, e.g. the rope-snake (*vikṣepa*). Object-ignorance on the other hand cannot be revealed by *sākṣī*. 'I do not know this' is not a productive knowledge. A contrary view is that every type of ignorance is the object of *sākṣī*[245]. In the case of the judgment 'I am ignorant,' the object is primary ignorance (*mūlājñāna*) while in 'I do not know the shell', the object is a particular ignorance, which is yet a part of the former. In knowing a fragment of *ajñāna*, *sākṣī* knows *mūlājñāna* itself; parts are identical with the whole.

What is the nature of the *sākṣī*? Some think that it is *kūṭastha* consciousness[246] which is the immediate witness of its two bodies, gross and subtle, but not affected by them. Even ordinarily indifference and revelation are associated with an empirical witness.

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The two bodies are revealed by *antaḥkaraṇavṛttis*, which however have gaps in between. Even then the bodies are continually revealed, though indefinitely, by the *kūṭastha* consciousness. Hence there is never any doubt about 'I'[247]; revelation is always there with *ahaṅkāra*. I-consciousness persists even while knowing something else. The *jīva* can appropriate this continuing consciousness of 'I', because of mutual ascription between *jīva* and *sākṣī*.[248] The *sākṣī* is indispensable since the agent or the individual can neither witness nor be indifferent. Being itself involved, it cannot be a mere spectator. The *sākṣī* is the ground of the *jīva* illusion. The *jīva* is only apparently a consciousness (*cidābhāsa*); it is of the nature of *ahaṅkāra*[249]. The *sākṣī* is like light which illumines objects when they are present before it and is self-luminous even when *ahaṅkāra* is absent in sleep.

Another opinion is that *sākṣī* is not *Īśvara*, but *brahman* as the innermost essence of the self (*sarva-pratyagbhūta*), is pure and not-different from *jīva*[250]. Some however maintain that *Īśvara*, as the knower of the activities of *jīva*. isself remaining indifferent, is *sākṣī*[251]. It is another form of *Īśvara*, but bereft of causality. Others hold that *sākṣī* is essentially *brahman*, though appearing as *jīva*, just as 'this' in 'this is snake' really belongs to the rope, but is appropriated by the snake[252]. Still another opinion is that the *jīva* itself is the *sākṣī*[253]; *jīva* is essentially inactive and indifferent (*sākṣī*), but when it is identified with the intellect (*antaḥkaraṇa*) it assumes the function of an agent (*jīva*); *jīva* is *sākṣī*, having *avidyā* as its *upādhi*.

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Others think that *jīva* as *antaḥkaraṇopahita caitanya*, having *antaḥkaraṇa* as its *upādhi*, is *sākṣī*[254]. If *avidyā* were the *upādhi* of *sākṣī*, then it would see the *antaḥkaraṇa* of other persons as well, since *avidyā* is universally present. *Sākṣī* is different for different persons, as *antaḥkaraṇas* are different. In sleep *antaḥkaraṇa* is present in a subtle (*sūkṣma*) form, and not totally absent. *Pramātā* is *antaḥkaraṇaviśiṣṭa*, while *sākṣī* is *antaḥkaraṇopahita*.

Sākṣī is covered by *ajñāna*. How then can it illumine *ajñāna*[255], the means of revelation viz. *antaḥkaraṇa* etc. being all covered? *Sākṣī* itself is not covered by *ajñāna*[256], but the latter hides other forms of consciousness. Hence *sākṣī* can reveal, since it is itself never covered. Another view is that it is partially covered only so far as its blissful nature is concerned, but is uncovered inasmuch as it is consciousness[257]. Since it has no covering, its knowledge does not depend on that type of *vṛtti* which functions by destroying covering (*āvaraṇābhibhava*). It reveals *ahaṅkāra* etc. directly, without the intervention of such *vṛttis*[258].

How then is *ahaṅkāra* remembered? Memory depends on *vṛttis* and not on *sākṣī*; impressions, (*saṁskāras*) which pertain to *vṛttis*, are fleeting, they arise and subside, are generated and become faint. How can they belong to *sākṣī*, the unchanging consciousness[259]? That is possible because even in deep sleep there is present the *avidyāvṛtti* of the form of 'I' (*ahaṅkāra*)[260]. There are impressions (*saṁskāras*) in that 'I' which can thus have memory of deep sleep.

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In sleep the 'I' continues in some form or other. Otheres hold that the *vṛtti* having the form of 'I' is an *antaḥkaraṇavṛtti*[261], not an *avidyāvṛtti*.

About the number of *vṛttis* involved in an illusion there is a controversy again. One opinion is that the illusory is an object of visual perception[262]. The ground (*idam*) is the object of a visual *vṛtti*, and the superimposition (*adhyāsa*) too, being simultaneous with it, is the object of the same *vṛtti*. Visualness of the shell-silver does not entail sense-contact[263]. Though the silver is not in contact with the eye, its perception is yet of a visual character. Sense-contact is not essential for perception[264], as is evident from the form of judgment 'I see silver'. There is thus only one *vṛtti* which is sensory, viz. *idam-vṛtti ; rajata-vṛtti* is superimposed and is identical with it[265]. Either there is no separate *rajata-vṛtti* at all[266]; it is merely *adhyasta* and is presented to *sākṣī* along with *idam-vṛtti ;* or there are two *vṛttis*[267]; (*a*) *idam-vṛtti* which is the cause (ground) of the *adhyāsa ;* (*b*) composite *vṛtti* of the form 'this is silver' (*idam rajatam*), which has the ascribed silver as its object. There is no pure *rajata-vṛtti*, absracted from 'this'. Our experience is always that of silver as identical with the 'this', i.e. 'I know this silver'.

Others hold that there are two *vṛttis*, one of 'this' the other simply of silver. These are flashed together in the same *sākṣī* consciousness, though as *vṛttis* they remain distinct[268].

Why should there be any *vṛtti* at all[269] ? Everything can be known directly by *sākṣī*. *Vṛtti* is essential

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in perception in order to establish identity between consciousness and object (*viṣaya-caitanya*)[270]. In mediate knowledge, though a *vṛtti* is required, its exit is not. Nor do internal states, like *ahaṅkāra*, happiness, pain etc. require exit of *vṛttis*, being in immediate contact with *sākṣī*[271]. In the case of an external object, both a *vṛtti* and its exit become necessary, in order to make it immediate and reveal its immediacy.

Sākṣī has to be accepted as self-luminous. In the waking life things can be revealed by external light, which however is absent in dreams and yet the dream-contents are illumined. This is possible only by the light of the self[272]. And anything that is known by the *sākṣī* alone, and not by the *pramātā* as well, is illusory[273].

Sākṣī is pure consciousness. Internal states like happiness etc, which are directly revealed by *sākṣī*, should have been impersonal and not individualized. This does not happen since intellect (*antaḥkaraṇa*) is imposed on *sākṣī* consciousness so that the contents are apportioned to the individual *jīvas* into which the *sākṣī* is split[274].

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III

THE 'I' AND BEYOND

The problem of *sākṣī* is essentially an adventure in depth analysis. What is the self? What are the roots of selfhood? How is it constituted? How is it structured or stratified? In what does its 'radicalness' consist? These questions are central to the 'philosophia perennis'. Self is also the major concern of the Advaita philosopher.

The contrast in empirical knowing between the changing and the unchanging is too obvious to be stressed. There are two factors involved in all knowing. On the one hand something varies; experience is a 'stream of consciousness'. All its contents change; nothing is stable, nothing endures. All knowledge is in an incessant flux. But on the other hand these discrete 'atoms' of experience are not left in their isolation, but are gathered up and appropriated by some other factor involved in experience. Knowledge is not merely a succession but also a fusion or a synthesis. All knowing has to be owned by somebody, so that what we really find is not just knowledge in the abstract, but invariably knowledge *of* somebody—"my" knowledge or "your" knowledge. Even if all experience is in a flux, we require a stable perspective or vantage-ground from which the fact of flux is itself to be noted. The assertion that there is change implies the awareness of that change, and

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this awareness must be something distinct, something which is not a part of what it is aware of. This is the 'I', the second factor involved in experience. All experience has the characteristic of 'belonging'— the items do not just float in a vacuum. It is the 'I' in which the several ingredients are synthesized. As Kant puts it: "Intuitions are nothing to us, and do not in the least concern us if they cannot be taken up into consciousness, in which they may participate either directly or indirectly. In this way alone is any knowledge possible. We are conscious *a priori* of the complete identity of the self in respect of all representations which can ever belong to our knowledge, as being a necessary condition of the possibility of all representations. For in me they can represent something only in so far as they belong with all others to one consciousness, and therefore must be at least capable of being so connected"[275]. The argument is really simple: to know things to be different we require an identical knower for all the differents[276], which therefore must also be different from the differents.

The 'I' as the background pre-condition of all experience is not however a mere form, as it is in Kant. For the latter, 'I' is known only as the knower of objects, and not as it is in itself. This form is not to be hypostatized as an entity. In Advaita however 'I' is something substantial, it is ontological. It is not merely the system or the frame of reference for the variety of mental states held together. It is a *sui generis* form of consciousness which remains self-

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identical amidst all change, against the stability of which change itself is to be measured.

The 'I still remains howeven empirical. The continuity of 'I' has gaps in it. During deep sleep the sense of 'I' is lost, to be resumed on waking up, but it is not felt to be another 'I'. On waking up I can certainly say 'I was' but while asleep I cannot say 'I am'. When I become self-conscious, when I am ashamed, e.g., I seem to become aware of myself as a distinct 'I' confronted with similar other egos. In these cases 'I' itself is objectified, looked upon as one more object among other objects. If in being aware of a content I at the same time distinguish myself from that content, the same logic would compel me to posit a deeper 'I' behind the 'I' that is objectified. It is a sort of 'impartial spectator', indifferent to the special privileges that the 'I' ordinarily enjoys. What is the subject that is aware of this 'I'? Not the 'I' itself, since that is already an object of investigation. 'I' cannot both be the subject and object at once, since the two functions are irreconcilable (*karma-kartṛ-virodha*). Fire cannot burn itslef, nor can light illumine itself. Hence the 'I' and that which is aware of that 'I' must be different. The 'I' is thus not the ultimate self. The argument does not indicate that the second 'I' posited behind the first is the real self—we shall see that it is not—but it certainly proves that the 'I' of which one can be self-conscious is not the real self, and that something more basic is required.

Several approaches are adopted in the Adviata, all converging towards that foundational consciousness.

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which illumines among other things, the 'I' itself. The evidence offered can be arranged under five different but overlapping categories: (1) Argument from deep sleep; (2) Argument from dream-consciousness; (3) Argument from illusion; (4) Argument from internal states; (5) Argument from waking experience. The explication of these arguments is basic to our understanding of the Advaita philosophy. We can attempt a cursory survey of the various issuesin volved.

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IV

ANATOMY OF SLEEP

Though sleeping is such a ubiquitous and common-sense event in our lives, its precise analysis still remains something of an enigma. What really happens when one goes to sleep ? There seem to be intermittent periods of lapsing into total unconsciousness. Though the body is there along with its purely vegetative functions, its presence is not felt or registered, at least during moments of deepest sleep. Sensory knowledge is effaced, and all means of referring to the sleeping 'I' become unavailable. The question is whether consciousness itself is present or not. Is sleep a state of complete blank ? Had there been a break in the flow of consciousness, one could not, on waking, resume the threads of his personal identity, and could conceivably wake up as some other person. The consciousness of identity is not something inferred from memory and from the present surroundings, but is immediate, without the intervention of any process. All this is inexplicable on the hypothesis of the state of sleep being a mere blank. A gap within consciousness could not leave memory traces to be revived later ; it could leave in fact nothing which could constitute evidence for the sense of continuing identity, which invades and engulfs us on waking. In any case, personal identity is not felt to be the result of any subsequent investigation as a sort of reconstruction.

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Though consciousness has thus to be postulated as being present during sleep, the fact remains that it appears to be absent and it needs some explanation. Why should something which is present not be manifested ? Here we arrive at a fundamental epistemological principle, viz. there is no consciousness of consciousness itself. The knower reveals objects, but it cannot turn round itself and reveal itself. And if it is to be known by a second knower we clearly have an infinite regress. What obtains in waking consciousness is not revelation of consciousness as such, but rather revelation of consciousness *as knowing the objects*. Consciousness is relational here, and this is indispensable for the revelation of consciousness. Advaita makes a basic distinction between consciousness and knowledge. Knowledge is the revelation *of* objects, by means of *vṛttis*, while consciousness is the principle of revelation itself. As such it is not known directly or immediately, not known as the content of a *pramāṇa*, but only regressively, only as the ground of all knowledge. Without there being this principle of revelation, the entire world would be plunged in darkness (*jagadāndhyaprasaṅga*).

The fact that there is revelation is made known only when there has been *revelation of something*. We are aware of the 'I' or the knower only *as* knowing objects. Object-knowledge therefore is an indispensable precondition of there being 'I'-consciousness. An enjoyer, e.g., is manifested as such only while enjoying the good things of life. If there were nothing to enjoy, where would the enjoyer be, and how could he be described as

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an enjoyer at all ? During sleep there is no knowledge of objects, the senses and the mind being dormant, and therefore there is no manifestation of any determinate content. Consequently the knower-function or the 'I' too lapses. Light would be indistinguishable from darkness if there were nothing for it to fall on.

The situation is complicated by the fact that the state of sleep is not timeless : there is also the subsequent waking up. And waking up does not land us into different personalities ; we wake up as the same persons we were. The 'I'-ness of the empirical life had therefore been present even during sleep, albeit in a latent or incipient form. The sleeping self and the waking 'I' are not two different selves, and there continuity is throughout maintained. The 'I' had been present without any explicit 'I'-consciousness. And since the latter is only a relational consciousness, the sleeping self too, as identical with it, must have been relational. It is not the pure self, not the bare principle of revelation, but must be a revelation *of* something. There is a second factor involved therefore, something that was revealed during sleep. Had the sleep consciousness been pure, bereft of all quality, there would be no distinction between *suṣupti* and *samādhi*, and one would effortlessly attain liberation. Though the self has shed its empirical gross body of its waking life, a subtle body still persists, a causal body which could again give rise to the 'I' as an effect. The sleeping self is still embodied, which is the condition of the possibility of its waking up as the same 'I'.

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What does this attenuated or residual 'I' reveal ? Gross objects have all disappeared, the necessary conditions for there revelation being absent. On waking up one says 'I slept soundly ; I did not know anything'. Paradoxically, this 'not knowing of anything' is itself known. And it must have been known during sleep itself ; the subsequent memory is not possible without the primary experience. The memory of not knowing anything cannot be an inference, since no data are available for making such an inference. If there had been no experience of not knowing, there would have been a gap in knowledge, to be reflected later as a gap in memory ; i.e. there would be no memory corresponding to the gap of not knowing. What we have is however, not a mere gap, but a positive confirmation of the absence of all knowledge, indicating an immediate experience of this absence. The absence in question is not therefore negative ; it must be a positive covering or obstruction, something which positively prevented any knowledge from taking place. This covering is ignorance, which is not a mere absence of knowledge (*jñānābhāva*) but a positive veil of total darkness in which the self is shrouded. The sleeping self is thus revealed as revealing the darkness (*ajñāna*), which is a kind of loose embodiment for the self, and which is the matrix of all distinctions and differentiations of the waking life. The sleeping self is the ignorant self, not to be equated with *brahman* or the pure self.

But how can consciousness be covered by ignorance ? Consciousness is opposed to ignorance,

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as light is to darkness (*tamaḥprakāśavad viruddha-svabhāva*). Ignorance is dispelled by consciousness (*jñānanivarttya*). However, ignorance is not simply the absence of knowledge, is not simply negative; it is a privation. Only that can be ignorant which should not have been so. There is no question of a stone being ignorant, since it could not be otherwise (*jaḍe āvaraṇakṛtyābhāvāt*). If there is to be ignorance at all, it could reside only in consciousness.

What then is the distinction between consciousness, in which ignorance resides, and the consciousness which dispels ignorance? Pure consciousness is not antithetical to ignorance, otherwise there would be no ignorance at all, as it cannot exist in anything else. What destroys ignorance is a particular knowledge (*vṛttijñāna or pramāṇajñāna*), which reveals an object by removing its previous unknownness or ignorance. Without a *vṛtti* the veil of unknownness would hide the object, preventing it from being revealed. Even the knowledge of *brahman*, the final liberating *coup de grâce* which removes the world-illusion, is itself a *vṛtti*, though a unique one (*akhaṇḍākāra vṛtti*). In the case of sleep there is no 'I' along with its *antaḥkaraṇa*, and consequently no piercing of the total veil that covers consciousness, so that consciousness and its covering reside in peaceful coexistence.

That consciousness is covered by darkness should not mean that its revelatory nature itself is covered. Ignorance that covers it is also revealed, and that too by the same consciousness that it covers. Consciousness does not remain ignorant of its own ignorance.

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Otherwise the memory judgment 'I did not know anything' would not have been possible. Of course ignorance cannot be known through a *pramāṇavṛtti ;* knowledge of ignorance through a *pramāṇa* is a contradiction in terms. A *vṛtti* removes the ignorance and cannot therefore reveal it. There can be a *pramāṇa* for absence, viz. *anupalabdhi*, but ignorance is something positive (*bhāvarūpa*). Hence ignorance is revealed directly and immediately without any intervention. This direct revelation of ignorance is logically inescapable. If one were ignorant about his ignorance, then the second-order ignorance would have to be removed first, in order that the judgment 'I did not know anything' is made possible. But the same problem would arise once again at the second level. Either we launch an infinite series of orders of ignorance, or we accept an unmediated revelation of the initial ignorance.

It may be objected that the consciousness, which is totally submerged in darkness, cannot reveal. But the covering in question only hides objects, preventing their manifestation. It does not suppress the revelatory nature of consciousness. Revelation is not an activity of consciousness which could be switched on and off, but rather its intrinsic nature (*svatva*) which can never be shed aside. The judgement 'I did not know anything' refers to the fact that particular objects were not revealed ; it does not imply absence of revelation. In fact consciousness did reveal something, viz. the fact that objects were not revealed. What was revealed instead was the total

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darkness into which all objects had withdrawn. Ignorance, as the basic stuff for the emergence of all duality, is revealed by that very consciousnes which it seeks to cover. The eclipse of the sun is visible because of the sun itself.[277] Consciousness reveals objects when they are there to be revealed. When the latter are hidden from its revelation, it still reveals, but now the covering itself. Revelation is absolute and timeless, not depending on the adventitious fact of there being something to be revealed. It is indifferent to what is offered to it for revelation. The light of revelation never goes out.

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V

THE WORLD OF DREAMS

Dream experience is unique in many respects. Almost an entire world of objects is created, wholly unreal and yet bearing a perfect verisimilitude, wherein all ordinary norms of credibility are totally suspended. Everything can appear in dreams, everything can happen, not merely objects and events encountered in waking life, but also entirely new combinations are plausibly tried out. The strange thing about them is that, though they are creatures of phantasy, they yet enjoy an inexplicable air of externality and objectivity. Things appear to happen, not in the mind, but 'out there'. Sense of externality comes from the consciousness of a body. What is inside the body is internal, while the external is what happens outside it. During sleep our body-awareness gets weakened, with the result that the distinction between the internal and the external loses its sharpness. Embodiment however is not completely shed; association with the gross physical body is absent, but there is the subtle body constituted by the impressions stored in the mind by the desires (*vāsanā*) of the waking life. The embodiment is therefore that of the body of desires (*vāsanāmaya śarīra*). Sleeping consciousness is thus not pure, but another form of embodied self. 'I'-consciousness continues, since *antaḥkaraṇa* is still present, though the latter does not function through its *vṛttis*, and therefore external objects are not

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apprehended. In the absence of *antaḥkaraṇa vṛttis*, the self of waking life, i.e. the *pramātā* which enjoys knowledge through *pramāṇas*, is not there. The two selves are however not utterly discontinuous; the contents of dreams are all supplied by the *vāsanās* of waking life, and on waking up it is the waking self that remembers having had that variegated and colourful phantasmagoria, appropriating them as its own. One person does not share the dreams of another.

Contents of dream experience, though being shown up as external, are really pulsations of mind. They are emanations from the self. The mind, or rather *avidyā* itself, associated with the sleeping self, gets directly transformed into the dream objects. They do not come from the external world, but are creations of consciousness. They cannot come from outside, since the senses do not function, and consciousness creates them out of its own resources. Since the objects are not external, they are not perceived through the mediation of the senses, mind, or *antaḥkaraṇa*, i.e. through the intervention of any *vṛtti*. Perception of dream objects is a case of immediate knowledge; they are seen directly, not through something else. The percipient is not the *pramātā*, since there is no *antaḥkaraṇa vṛtti* to see with. Nor, on the other hand, is it entirely different from the *pramātā*, since the objects are products of the impressions stored during the waking life, and appropriated again by the waking self. Dreams are seen by some consciousness which is invariably present along with the *pramātā*, though itself always remaining in the background.

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Dream experience is transitional; it comes in between waking consciousness, by which it is produced, on the one hand, and dreamless sleep on the other, when the objects are all retracted into *avidyā* or *ajñāna*, the primary stuff which they are made of. During waking life, and again during dreaming, causality operates at both its poles, i.e. as cause, viz. primary ignorance, and also as effect, viz. the particular contents exhibited. In dreamless sleep however we find only the unipolar functioning of causation. Only the cause, viz. ignorance, is there to be perceived, while all its products have merged back within it. Products of *avidyā* can exist either in their actual realized form, or only potentially. Dreamless sleep is a state of pure potentiality, while the other two experiences represent objects both in their potential as well as actualized form.

The importance of the dream state lies in the fact that it is here that the nature of consciousness as self-luminous revelation becomes most explicit. Though the self is never bereft of its self-luminosity, it is not evident during waking life, where the light of self mingles with extraneous sources of revelation, so that its own specific character is obscured. And during dreamless sleep light seems to be shrouded in total darkness, and even the presence of revelation is not detected; it is only by a regressive analysis that we become aware that it had really been present all along. But during dreams all external illumination ceases and yet perception of objects is not hindered thereby. The light by which dream objects get revealed can be of none other than the self itself. While the body,

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the senses, the *vṛttis*, everything goes to sleep, something remains awake, which reveals and witnesses whatever is presented before it. Only this self-luminosity is its essential nature, not its creativity, not its being transformed into the dream objects, not even its witnessing of contents standing out before it, but bare revelation, which is unaffected by the presence or absence of *vāsanās*, and therefore of objects to be revealed, unaffected whether its revelatory nature is manifested or not. All this does not become explicit at the stage of the dreaming self, but only at the *turīya* state.

The characteristic feature of dreams is that every thing in them is illusory, including even objectivity or 'thisness' (*idantā*) without which no object-experience is possible. Illusions occur during waking life too, but their 'thisness', e.g. in the illusory judgment 'this is snake', is itself not illusory. It is in fact borrowed from the ground of the illusion, viz. the rope, which is really there, and the snake-illusion feeds on its objective reality. Consequently, the illusory snake has a location in empirical space and time. One could significantly say 'The snake appeared at that corner, around seven in the evening'. This could be said even in the case of a total hallucination, since even that takes place in the over-all context of reality. One could thus say 'The ghost appeared near that door, while we were seated for dinner'. But dreams locate no meeting place not time reference. I might dream, while sleeping in Varanasi, that I am seeing somebody in Calcutta. And the dream meeting might take place in some morning while the

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dreaming is actually being experienced late in the night. The references of time, place, objectivity, are all significant only in the particular context of dreaming, and cannot reach out to any external frame-work.[278] This being the case, what could be the ground of the dream-experience? A ground there must be—the Advaita is utterly committed to this; there can be no groundless illusion (*niradhiṣṭhāna khyāti*). The required ground cannot be the objectivity of real empirical things since, as just seen, ties with empirical reality are completely snapped off. Objectivity here is totally spurious, unlike that of the illusory rope-snake where some tenuous link with the real rope is maintained. The specious objectivity (thisness) of the dream contents is not grounded on anything externally real. This situation is generalized by some Advaita thinkers who hold that even in the case of empirical illusion, there is no real objectivity (*idantā*). They insist that everything in the context of illusion is equally illusory.[279] Even the so-called 'thisness' of the illusory content is illusory. In the judgment 'this is snake' both the terms are false, the 'snake' because it is an impostor, the 'this' because it is an inextricable aspect of the whole context, not to be isolated as a free floating support, now associated with the snake appearance, now with the real rope. This is perilously close to the Mādhyamika position that the entire illusory complex is false, and no term may be retrieved from it as transcendent. This school of Advaita is also committed to making a distinction between the apparent ground *ādhāra*) and the real ground (*adhiṣṭhānā*). The

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latter does not even appear as the 'this', to be associated with the snake, while what does so appear, viz. the *ādhāra*, is as much false as the snake is. The orthodox doctrine is however not so radical. The 'this' is not false in itself, but only in so far as it allows itself to be imposed on (*saṁsargato mithyā*) ; the snake is of course intrinsically false (*svarūpato mithyā*).

In any case the 'thisness' flaunted by the dream contents is a part of the illusion, and cannot therefore serve as its ground which has to be sought elsewhere. The ground cannot be anything external, but must be some form of consciousness. Can *brahman* or pure consciousness serve as the ground ? The difficulty is that sublation of an illusion results in the knowledge of the ground, and consequently one should wake up from a dream with *brahmajñāna* ! It might be held that the empirical 'I' (*jīva*) is the ground. But since the illusory is identified with its ground, e.g., in the judgment 'this is snake' where the 'this' is the ground, so also here the dream-elephant would be identified with the 'I' that is supposed to be its ground, resulting in the judgment 'I am elephant'. In fact everything that is dreamt of would be identified with 'I', so that all dream judgments would have the form 'I am X', where 'X' is any dream content. The most plausible hypothesis is that it is the *sākṣī* consciousness that is the ground on which all dream experience is based. It witnesses what are essentially its own creatures.

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VI

STRUCTURE OF ILLUSION

Illusion is a privative experience, the appearance of something which should not have appeared. It is not a straightforward ordinary object of cognition, or it would not have been illusory in the first instance. Though it enjoys a spatio-temporal habitat, a closer scrutiny reveals that it was not its own at all. Suppose I see a piece of shell as silver on the beach at 10 a.m. Should I be justified in saying that the silver existed there at that time? I now realize that what really obtained there at that time was merely a piece of shell; there had been no silver there at all at any time. Of course some genuine silver might have existed at some other place, but that is utterly irrelevant to the appearance in question. The shell-silver refuses to accept any empirical description or predication. Can I say that the 'silver' was of a certain size, was very shining and was half-buried in the sand. All these descriptions really describe the shell and nothing else. The 'silver' has no predicate of its own, no characterization, nothing which could fix its identity. The 'silver' is indescribable.

The illusory is thus nothing empirical; it is a freak out of nowhere as it were. Being non-empirical, it cannot be known by any *pramāṇa* or any empirical means of knowledge. All knowledge takes place as the revelation of some object that already exists, but

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shrouded in the veil of unknownness, i.e. ignorance. Knowledge is the removal of this ignorance; it does not make the object come into being, but merely reveals what had been already there. A *pramāṇa* is the means of removing the veil hiding the object (*āvaraṇābhibhava*). The illusory object however is never hidden; it has no unknown existence, since it is nothing 'out there'. Its sole existence is in being perceived (*pratibhāsamātra-śarīratva*). Its *esse* is its *percipi*. Never being hidden, there is no question of revealing it by removing its veil of unknownness. There is no *making* it immediate, as it had never been otherwise. Hence no *pramāṇa* is available for the revelation of the illusory. It cannot exist but as known; in its case there is no transition from the previous state of unknownness to the subsequent revelation.

The illusory is therefore non-empirical, and cannot be known by the empirical 'I' (*pramātā*); the only means by which it knows is through some *pramāṇa* or other. A depth analysis of the structure of illusion reveals the highly complex character of the experience, and the different factors involved are to be carefully disentangled. Four strands in its complex texture can be distinguished, viz. *adhiṣṭhāna*, *āvaraṇa*, *vikṣepa* and *adhyāsa*, and these can be briefly considered.

The illusory, as seen just now, has no predicate, in fact, nothing of its own. Whatever is said about the 'silver' really characterizes the shell, so that the 'silver' is a mere parasite, masqueradng under

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borrowed plumes. In itself it is a sheer naught. Hence it can appear only by presenting forged credentials which really belong to something else. It presupposes therefore a ground (*adhiṣṭhāna*) the reality of which it feeds on. There is no illusion without a ground, since in that case it would lack a *locus standi* or a platform and could not even appear. The denial of the possibility of a groundless illusion (*niradhiṣṭhāna khyāti*) distinguishes the Advaita position from that of the Mādhyamika, at least as understood or misunderstood by all the non-Buddhist schools.

But the mere presence of *adhiṣṭhāna*, though necessary, is not a sufficient condition for the occurence of illusion. Any shell is not mistaken for silver but is seen, not infrequently, as what it is. But if a shell could be seen *as* a shell, in its true colours, then the possibility of misconstruing it would not arise. In order that the mistaking could occur the shell should not be known as shell; it should exist but should remain unknown, so that the 'silver' could borrow its reality and character. The shell must go into hiding (*āvaraṇa*) since the knowledge of the ground dispels the illusion. There is something that covers the shell and prevents it from being known.

But mere unknownness of the shell is again not sufficient for the appearance of the 'silver'. If something remains hidden, it is simply not known, but that by itself does not account for the emergence of a specious appearance. If there is a veil or curtain in front of me, I do not know what lies behind it, but

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I do not start seeing something else instead. Lack of knowledge would be perceived as a mere blank. But in the case of the silver-illusion there is some filling in of the gap, something else takes place. There is something projected (*vikṣepa*), something that exploits the gap and misappropriates the existence of the ground that is covered.

Even now the picture is not complete. What is projected cannot stand on its own legs, since it has no reality of its own. Shell and silver are not two distinct entities; the latter is nothing in itself and can exist only as imposed on or ascribed (*adhyāsa*) to the shell. When the illusion is sublated we do not have them separately which were somehow messed up before; the so-called 'silver' explodes into nothingness. Hence there is a positive confusion or identification between the two. The 'silver', being nothing apart from the shell, is identical with the latter. The mistake consists in taking a thing amiss; it is the shell that appears as the silver.

Illusion thus is a highly complex affair. Its content is not real, as it is sublated. Nor is it unreal, being identical with its real ground. If we analyse the illusory judgment 'this is silver', we find that there are two different elements in it, viz. that which is ascribed to and the ascription itself. The subject or ground of the ascription is real. On the dispelling of the illusion, the 'this' part is not cancelled, but is realized to belong really to the shell which was obscured before. The 'silver' part is however utterly annihilated

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as not belonging to the order of reality. Illusion is thus a real-unreal configuration, and its constituents are to be traced back to two different sources, belonging to different ontological levels. Hence the Advaita speaks of two *vṛttis* in explaining the genesis of illusion, viz. the *antaḥkaraṇavṛtti* and the *avidyāvṛtti*. The *antaḥkaraṇa* (internal organ) pertains to the 'this' part which is real and which is capable of being covered and of being known by uncovering, while the *avidyāvṛtti* pertains to the ascribed part, i.e. the 'silver'. The two *vṛttis* get fused into one; they are positively identified, not merely their distinction being non-apprehended, as in *akhyāti*. The *vṛttis* are of course different, each having its own object, but both are reflected and consequently identified in the same consciousness. The theory of *akhyāti* maintains that the two separate *vṛttis* exist unrelated, only their lack of relation, their having nothing to do with each other, is not appreciated (*vivekāgraha*). But the matter is not so simple. The two *vṛttis* might have been distinct to start with, but illusion takes place only when there is positive confusion, and literally one is read into the other.

Since the contents of the two *vṛttis* belong to different levels, they are accordingly cognized by two different 'selves'. The 'this' can be known in the normal way, by uncovering what was hidden before, and the subject is in this case the empirical 'I' or the *pramātā*. The 'silver' has however no hidden existence and, as such, cannot be known by any ordinary or empirical means. It is really perceived by the trans-

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cendental self or the *sākṣī*. To be known by the *sākṣī* is not to be known without a *vṛtti*, but only without a *pramāṇa*. A *vṛtti* is involved in any case of knowing, whether that of the *pramātā* or the *sākṣī*. That *vṛtti* which corresponds to the knowing of the empirical ego is an *antaḥkaraṇavṛtti*, while the 'silver' is apprehended by the *sākṣī* by means of *avidyāvṛtti*. Though there are thus two agents of knowing that are involved here, the 'I' or the *pramātā* appropriates as its own knowledge what is really perceived by the *sākṣī*. The illusory as non-empirical is incapable of being cognized by the *pramātā*, but the latter owns it up, and also makes the subsequent cancellation judgment, viz. 'I perceived the silver, but I was mistaken'. Illusion is a unitary but synthetic experience and its appropriation by the 'I' which cannot in the strict sense own it, indicates the indissoluble unity of the stratified self.

That which confers objectivity to the illusory, viz. the 'this', is an object of a visual (*cākṣuṣa*) *vṛtti*. The ascribed 'silver' too, which is only an *adhyāsa*, is an object of the same *vṛtti*. The visual character of the 'silver' does not involve any sense-contact, and such contact is thus not essential for perception. Illusion has a perceptible or visual quality which has not been brought about by any sense-contact. The spurious 'silver' is imposed on the shell which is really a form of consciousness (*viṣayacaitanya*). It is at the same time imposed on the *sākṣī*-consciousness, since the two forms of consciousness are essentially identical. Hence it is revealed only by the *sākṣī*, to be appropriat-

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ed by the corresponding ego or 'I', and therefore it is not revealed to another 'I' or a different person. One person does not participate in the illusion of another.

The illusory is a transformation of *avidyā*. *Avidyā* is transformed in a two-fold way, viz. as 'silver' and as knowledge of that 'silver'. *Avidyā* is itself the object of *sākṣī*. Or, alternatively, it is consciousness (*sāksī caitanya*) that is transformed into the object of illusion, since this consciousness already has *avidyā* as its adjunct (*upādhi*). Consciousness is directly transformed in the case of the internal states, and indirectly, by the mediation of the object-consciousness (*viṣayacaitanya*), in the case of 'silver'.

A possible misconception might arise here. Since the illusory is a transformation of the *sākṣī*-consciousnes which is identified with the 'I', the resultant judgment should have the form 'I am silver' and not 'this is silver'. But, as already seen, the 'silver' is not a product of the *sākṣī* directly, but indirectly through the ignorance of the *pramātā*. 'Thisness' really belongs to the object consciousness (*viṣayacaitanya*) which again is identical with the 'I'-consciousness (*pramātṛcaitanya*). But the link of the illusory with real objectivity is never lost and hence the illusory 'silver' can appear only as predicated of a 'this' and not of an 'I'.

The problem again arises as to the necessity of an *avidyāvṛtti* at all. Revelation of the *sākṣī* is always direct and immediate, unlike as in the case of the *pramātā*. That the latter could know only by means of a *vṛtti* is easily understood. But the role a *vṛtti*

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plays in the case of knowing by the *sākṣī* is not so clear. Any immediacy, the Advaita maintains, is possible only on the basis of identity. If the object of knowledge were utterly different from its knower, a gap between them would always be there, with the result that absolute immediacy could never be secured. For the latter, some kind of identity is essential. But when this basic identity is not explicit, some means would have to be employed for identifying what are apparently not identical. This means of identification is a *vṛtti*. If identity were already given, then of course a *vṛtti* is not called for. But where it has to be established, then a *vṛtti* becomes indispensable. In the case of an external object, a *vṛtti* has to go out in order to annul the gap between subject and object, making the latter immediate.

In the case of the *sākṣī* however nothing is hidden, nothing is remote or external. What then is the function of a *vṛtti* here ? Some amount of unclarity is found in the literature in this regard. One school of thought holds that in the case of illusion there is only one *vṛtti* involved, viz. the sensory *vṛtti* pertaining to the 'this' (*idam vṛtti*). The *vṛtti* that refers to the 'silver' (*rajata vṛtti*) is simply identical with it. Another version of the same theory is that there is no separate *rajata vṛtti* at all; the 'silver' is merely imposed (*adhyasta*) on the *vṛtti* referring to the 'this' (*idam vṛtti*). Another opinion is that though there are two *vṛttis*, there is no pure *rajata vṛtti*. The two *vṛttis* in question are, first, the 'this' and secondly 'this is silver'. The *rajata vṛtti* cannot be abstracted from the 'this' (*idam*). The

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most considered view is that of *Vivaraṇa* which maintains that there are two distinct *vṛttis* (*idam vṛtti* and *rajatavṛtti*), but both flashed together in the same consciousness.

The judgment 'this is silver' is thus both true and false, true in referring to a real 'this', false in referring to an unreal ascription. The real and the unreal are both equally objects of *sākṣī* which reveals everything. Hence its knowledge is neither valid nor invalid. It cannot make alethic distinctions which are all made by the intellect (*buddhi*). That knowledge where the *pramātā* with its *antaḥkaraṇa* is not involved, that which is known by the *sākṣī* alone, is illusory.[280]

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VII

HAPPINESS AND PAIN

Internal states like feelings of happiness and pain (*sukha* and *duḥkha*), emotions of anger and grief, and other mental states occupy a peculier plaae in the economy of our ordinary experience. On the one hand they are unlike the external objects which are explicitly different from the ego. Objects are obviously outside us and are perceived as such. There is a physical separation between an object and its percipient. I may detach myself from my pen and watch, leave my wife at home (possibly causing her some hurt) and even get rid of my clothes (however embarrassing that might be for all concerned). But I cannot put my happiness on the table, or my grief in my pocket. These states seem to be a part of myself and have no independent existence of their own. They can exist only as belonging to somebody. But on the other hand they are themselves objects of cognition. Happiness and its awareness, inextricably intertwined as they might appear to be, have still to be distinguished as belonging to different categories. Consciousness still retains its intrinsic intentionality, its directedness towards something other than itself, but now this intentionality seems to become completely immanent, in that its objects do not maintain a distance from itself. Happiness thus is not absolutely one with the self that knows that happiness, and could only be ascribed to the latter. In knowing

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happiness I perceive, not the self as such, but the self only as characterized by this quality. Happiness is a quality, i.e. an *upādhi* (modification) of *buddhi* (intellect) in which the real self is reflected. What is perceived are only such qualities and not the self that perceives them. Distinction between the subject and its object is basic and still remains. Happiness is still an object, hence its knower too cannot be an object. That which is the subject of everything is the object of nothing. Happiness etc. are qualities that are ascribed (*adhyasta*) to the self and are not intrinsic to it. They arise due to past impressions (*vāsanā*) while the light of consciousness never waxes and wanes (*aluptadṛksvabhāva*). Of course empirical happiness must be distinguished from the serenity and peace enjoyed in deep sleep. The latter is not a quality at all but is the very nature of the self (*sukhasvarūpa*). This natural happiness never goes out, but may be obscured by pain which is absent in deep sleep.

The striking feature about the internal states is that they never remain unknown. The illusory too, as seen in the previous section, has no unknown existence, but the two cases are not parallel. The illusory claims objectivity, pretends to exist just like any other empirical object, and in this claim there is an appearance of an unrevealed depth which the illusory does not really possess. It appears as though the 'silver' was there even prior to my seeing it. The appearance is of course false, but at least the claim is made. In the case of happiness, there is not even

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the pretence of having an unknown existence. As long as my happiness lasts, it can exist only as revealed to me. It would be very odd indeed if one were to say 'I am happy, but I am not aware of it'. A person, reminiscing on the days gone by, might plausibly say 'I was happiest during my student days, only I did not know it', but this locution is to be construed, not as indicating the possibility of an unknown happiness, but rather as making a contrast between the past and the present in which the past *now* appears as relatively more peaceful than the turbulent years succeeding it. The happiness ascribed to the past is not a genuine feeling, but a relative assessment. A genuine feeling can exist only as revealed.

That being the case, there is no covering (*āvaraṇa*) for happiness. Hence the ordinary mode of knowing something, viz. by dispelling the covering of ignorance, would be out of question here. Happiness is not to be discovered, since it had never been covered at all. There is never any ignorance about one's own happiness; there is no such thing as an unconscious happiness. The situation is very different when I come to know about the happiness of someone else, since then it is as remote as any other object, and ignorance is possible in this case. I may not always know about your feelings. This ignorance does not belong to the *sākṣī*, but is that of the empirical 'I', the *pramātā*. And another person's happiness is known precisely in the same manner as an external object, since the two cases are parallel. Something obtains, but I am ignorant about it, and this ignorance hiding the

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object has to be dispelled by means of a *vṛtti*. It is therefore the *prāmātā* that is the knower here.

My own happiness however is directly revealed to me. A *vṛtti* is still involved as consciousness has yet not shed its intentionality, but it is a *vṛtti* of a very different kind. The *sākṣī* has no covering (*āvaraṇa*) and its knowledge does not depend on that type of *vṛtti* which functions by destroying covering (*āvaraṇā-bhibhava*). The *vṛtti* does not have to go out here, as happiness is in immediate contact with the *sākṣī*. In the case of an external object such exit or going out of a *vṛtti* is essential, since an external object is initially not given as immediate. It might be present, but that presence may be shrouded in the darkness of ignorance. It has therefore to be made immediate and this is where a *vṛtti* has its role to play. Happiness, on the contrary, is intimately possessed by the knowing self, and does not have to be made immediate. The tortuous process of *vṛtti*-knowledge is consequently short-circuited.

Why is happiness always felt as individual or personal. It is known at a deeper level than the personal 'I' ; why then should it be attached to a person ? The reason is that the intellect (*antaḥkaraṇa*) is imposed on the *sākṣī*, and as a result the knowledge of the *sākṣī* is appropriated by the *pramātā*. The impersonal self is thus split up into the different egos of persons. The empirical 'I' becomes the ultimate enjoyer of happiness, making the judgment 'I am happy' possible.

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VIII

ANALYTIC OF EXPERIENCE

The whole of our empirical discourse can be described in terms of two basic categories, viz. the subject and the object, the seer (or rather seeing) and the seen, *dṛk* and *dṛśya*. There are objects which constitute the furniture of the world and these exist in their own right. Apart from revelation, objects are completely independent of the knowing act. Advaita endorses a realistic theory of knowledge according to which knowledge is revelation of what is already there (*vastutantra*), and does not add anything to it or distort it in any manner. Cognition is completely determined by its object; knownness is not essential to the latter. In fact the object would be false if it had depended on knowledge (*pratibhāsamātra-śarīratva*).

The object however is inert (*jaḍa*) and must be evidenced by something else. If objects were not revealed, they would be as good as non-existent so far as the subject is concerned. The whole world would then be plunged in darkness (*jagadāndhya-prasaṅga*). There must therefore be something, other than the object, that reveals or witnesses. Knowledge is for us the only index of existence. To say that an object exists is to know it. Even to say that a thing does not exist presupposes illumination, since even denial is a form of awareness. There is no

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experience that is not witnessed, (no *niḥsākṣika anubhava*). This principle of illumination is consciousness (*caitanya*).

Knowledge reveals what already exists. The object must have existed even before it came to be known. But why was it not known then, since both the terms in the knowledge situation were already available ? Something must have come in between, something positive and opaque, that prevented it from being known. Revelation of the object is not adding anything to it, but it is only removing the covering that obstructed knowledge. Knowledge takes place by uncovering, or removing the obstructing veil. The obstruction that hides things is ignorance (*ajñāna*), and what removes the obstruction or limitation is a *vṛtti*. The function of a *vṛtti* is purely negative (*āvaraṇābhibhava*) ; it does not make the object come into being, but only manifests it.

Even if the object were to be manifested and laid bare, even if it stood completely unveiled, there would still be no knowledge, if the content to be known were a total stranger to the knower. The gulf between two totally disparate entities would be unbridgeable. They can come together and be relevant to each other, only if there were some community or affinity between the two, only if they were essentially the same. All relations presuppose an underlying identity of the relata, but for which they would fly apart. Hence all knowledge is by identity, or rather identification, since the identity is not explicit. But the paradox is that identity would apparently dissolve all rela-

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tionship. If the knower were one with what it knows, there would be nothing to be known, and there would be no knower either. In order to sustain the knowledge relation, some distance or difference has to be injected into the basic identity. This is the function of the veil of ignorance, which cuts up undifferentiated consciousness into the duality of subject and object. The subject or the knower is consciousness, but limited by egoity (*ahaṅkāra*), having the adjunct of 'I'. This is *pramātṛcaitanya*. The object too is essentially consciousness (*viṣayacaitanya*), again circumscribed by various limiting conditions. Ignorance prevents the realization that both are essentially the same, so that what is really one with the knowing consciousness appears to be something 'out there', dead and inert, something hidden and alienated which is to be revealed. A fissure which is not really there opens up between the two which are not really two. Hence some intervening *tertium quid* is required which would mediate between them, and reestablish their underlying continuity. That is the role of a *vṛtti* which penetrates through the covering of ignorance (*āvaraṇa*), and shows up the nature of both as the same consciousness. Complete identity, which would destroy all empirical knowing, is not manifested since the covering is only partially removed by the intellect (*antaḥkaraṇa*). Not ignorance in toto, but only so far as a definite object is concerned, is destroyed, and knowledge also takes place only to that extent.

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A *vṛtti* is a modification of the mental stuff variously called *buddhi*, *citta*, *manas*, *antaḥkaraṇa* etc.. It goes out through the senses and assumes the form of the object it reaches. Senses by themselves are also inert and do not produce knowledge. They are only the outlets or channels through which *buddhi* can move. The real cause of knowledge is *buddhi* and not the senses. *Buddhi* however, in its own turn, is equally inert (*jaḍa*), and cannot generate knownness unaided. Knownness is really the function of consciousness alone. It gets reflected in mind (*buddhi*) or the inner sense (*antaḥkaraṇa*) producing the sense of egoity (*ahaṅkāra*), the differentiating feature of the empirical self which we know as the 'I' (*jīva*, *pramātā*, *cidābhāsa*). It is the *pramātā* that pervades the various *vṛttis* as "I", and is the agent (*kartā*) and enjoyer (*bhoktā*) of knowing, A *vṛtti* cannot exist without consciousness. It stands midway between appearance and reality, between *avidyā* and *caitanya*.. It is associated with *avidyā*, since it is its product (*pariṇāma*), and also with consciousness or rather the reflection of consciousness in it (*cidābhāsa*), without which a *vṛtti* cannot illumine, being in itself *jaḍa*. The reflected consciousness or the 'I' is the *jīva*, which is a totality of (*a*) consciousness (*b*) subtle body and (*c*) reflection of consciousness in that body. This is the empirical ego, related to the empirical world.

But the 'I' can know only through its assocation with its conditions (*upādhi*) like *buddhi*, *manas*, *citta* etc., and cannot therefore be the real knower. If those auxilliary conditions or *upādhis* were absent,

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knowledge would not take place though both of its terms are constant. The knower and the object might both be present, without the knower necessarily knowing its object. Both the terms are invariable, and do not explain the variability of knowing. The object is sometimes not known, and then comes to be known. If the 'I' were the knowing self, then there would be either always knowledge, or there would never be knowledge, but the variability would remain unaccounted for. The 'I' can thus know only through the instrumentality of its *upādhis* which come and go and act as mediators between the knower and the known.

These *upādhis* constitute the 'body' of the empirical ego (*jīva*). In the Indian context, the body is never understood as merely physical (gross body), but it always includes the psychic factors as well (subtle body). The 'I' is the embodied self, though the embodiment too is as much an object as any other. It is the embodied self that is the agent of knowing (*kartā*) and its enjoyer (*bhoktā*). It is always associated with egoity (*ahaṅkāra*), without which there is no knowledge. Consciousness by itself does not amount to knowledge; the invariable is not the variable.

The 'I' neverthless is not the real self. Though essentially consciousness, the 'I' is limited by egoity (*ahaṅkāra*) and the subtle body (*antaḥkaraṇa viśiṣṭa*). It is the reflection of consciousness in *buddhi* (*cidābhāsa*). Though invariable relative to the object, it is itself variable. The waking 'I' is different from

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the dreaming 'I', while it is almost completely absent during dreamless sleep. The sense of egoity is discontinuous. The 'I' is not pure consciousness, but is qualified by *avidyā*, and is only empirical, The 'I' is illusory, in fact the primary illusion (*aham iti yāvat prathamo'dhyāsaḥ*).[281] Some principle therefore must be there which illumines everything, including even the 'I', which, as changing, is the not-self, itself to be known as an object. The changing cannot know itself as changing, and thus the ultimate subject is required. 'I am a man', 'I am an agent', in all these judgments the 'I' is not the self. It cannot be its own subject (*karmakartṛtvavirodha*). The real self can only be that which is not to be known by anything else, on pain of infinite regress. The 'I' always refers to the not-self; 'I'-ness is not intrinsic to the self, in that the latter can also be without it, as in dreamless sleep. Egoity (*ahaṅkāra*) is a blend of self and not-self.

The real self is the *sākṣī*, the witness consciousness. It is the ultimate principle of revelation on which is imposed all plurality, all epistemic distinctions of knower, known and knowledge (*pramātā*, *prameya* and *pramāṇa*). It is the witness of their coming and going. Just as ornaments are not essential to the person wearing them, so all these changing functions are not essential to the ultimate subject. It is the witness of the mutual difference of different egos (*pramātās*). Everything is its object, but it is itself the object of nothing. The 'I' or *pramātā* is ascribed to the self-evident witness consciousness. The latter

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(*sākṣī*) is the real self (*puruṣa*), the indwelling essence of the knower (*antaryāmī*). It continues in all states, sees through the senses, sees dreams when senses are dormant, and does not dream in deep sleep. It is timelessly continuous (*amṛta*). It is not the enjoyer but merely sees. Nor does activity belong to it. It is *buddhi* that is active, going out to seek and reach the object with the help of the senses, but this activity is wrongly ascribed to the *sākṣī*. Just as a static ray of sun-light, when entering the room through a chink in the window, appears to dance, the activity of *buddhi* is ascribed to the inactive *sākṣī*. The latter however overreaches *buddhi* in the sense that it continues even when *buddhi* ceases to function. In itself, it is beyond *buddhi*, and therefore beyond language. It is of the nature of unchanging consciousness, the witness of all (*sarvasākṣī*). It is continuous in that the self in all states remains self-identical. The waking self is a continuation of the sleeping self. It does not really sleep, but remains awake while the sleeper, i.e. the empirical 'I', goes to sleep, and again shows up the dream contents created by *avidyā*. After all this, the same 'I' wakes up, having the memory of what happened while sleeping and dreaming. One person does not wake up as somebody else, or there would be an end of all significant discourse. Objects differ while consciousness remains invariable. Dream contents differ from those of waking life, and hence consciousness must be different from both. It cannot arise or perish, since these themselves need being witnessed.

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There are thus two kinds of 'seeing': empirical and transcendental. The first, for example, is the seeing of a pot; this seeing is in time, as it comes into being and has an and, and is conditioned, depending as it does on the presence of the pot. Seeing a pot also depends on the senses, *antaḥkaraṇa* etc. It is transient seeing (*anitya*). The other kind of seeing is intrinsic (*nitya*); it does not come and go. It never ceases, is self-evidencing, and is always witnessing the transient, from waking to dreaming. In this case the seeing cannot be distinguished from the seer, and their apparent separation is only due to *upādhis*. This constitutes the background or the horizon of all empirical seeing. Everything is illumined by its light; it is the knower of all knowledge. Being the seer of all seeing (*dṛṣṭer draṣṭā*), it is never bereft of its seeing function (*na hi draṣṭur dṛṣṭer viparilopo vidyate*). Its not seeing, as in deep sleep, is only ascribed (*upacarita*) . It is bare awareness (*jñapti*), pervades everything known, which latter might vary but not the knowing of them. It is the principle of illumination (*ātmajyoti*), shining even when all extraneous sources of light fail. Illumination seems externalized, when senses function under external conditions. Lacking these there seems to be no illumination. But its subterranean presence persists nevertheless as the internal source of light, different from the seen. It is thus non-empirical, shining in its own light (*svayamjyoti*). It is self-luminous even during the waking state, but is constricted by light from external sources, *manas*, *buddhi* etc.

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Awareness has no other function apart from illumination, anything else being merely ascribed to it (*upacarita*). It is thus the unrelated (*asaṅga, sarva-sasṁsargarahita*). Being continuous in all states, it cannot be identified with any one of them. The waking state is characterized by relatedness (*saṁsarga*), viz. the subject-object duality, which is the work of ignorance (*avidyā*). Being of the nature of bare consciousness, there can be no self-consciousness in it. It is not the consciousness *of* anything; neither intentionality nor reflexivity is intrinsic to it. *Sākṣī* means the unrelated, the unchanging. In waking life its nature as *svayamjyoti* is not distinguishable from *buddhi*, senses, light etc..

Vṛtti-knowledge is strictly speaking not knowledge at all, since a *vṛtti* is something non-luminous (*jaḍa*). It is still called 'seeing' (*dṛṣṭi*) because of reflection of consciousness in it, and it then functions like consciousness. Consciousness however is all-pervasive, pervedes all 'seeing' (*dṛṣṭi* or *vṛtti*). The seeing of *vṛtti* is an act, but the *sākṣī* has no activity. Its seerhood consists in its all-pervadingness. Though unrelated, and not an activity of seeing—which is appropriate only in the case of *vṛttis*—it is yet called seeing by ascription (*lakṣaṇā*), like in the judgement 'the sun illumines'. Illumination or seeing is not its activity but its mere presence, activity being transferred to it (*upacarita*). Similarly its being the 'seer' or agent (*kartā*) of seeing is also an ascription. Empirieal knowing on the other hand is relational; it is determined by *antaḥkaraṇa*, which becomes a

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determining limitation (*avacchedaka*) of consciousness, only when it is in relation to an object.

Knowledge is thus constituted by a *vṛtti* in which consciousness is reflected, and the whole complex is illumined by pure consciousness (*sākṣī*). Consciousness, with the help of a *vṛtti* of the form of pot, can reveal only that pot, resulting in the judgment 'This is a pot'. But the knownness of the pot is revealed only by pure consciousness. If that also were to be known by another *vṛtti*, there would clearly be an infinite regress. This direct apprehension that 'The pot is known'—the Nyāya calls it *anuvyavasāya*—cannot be revealed by the empirical self (*jīva* or *cidābhāsa*) but only by the transcendental *sākṣī* (*kūṭastha*) consciousness, to which alone final knowing is to be credited. Knownness is a function, neither of *buddhi* alone which is *jaḍa*, nor of *sākṣī* alone which was timelessly available even prior to knowledge. It is generated by the empirical ego (*cidābhāsa*) but is again illumined by *sākṣī* (*kūṭastha*). There is thus a double knownness, first by *jīva* and then by *sākṣī*. It is not really two separate acts of knowing, since one is imposed on the other and there is mutual ascription. All *vṛttis* are revealed by the *sākṣī* consciousness.

Empirical knowing depends on some *pramāṇa* or other. Empirical existence is constituted by plurality and difference where the essential identity of all things remains obscured. The object is falsely separated from its knower, so that there appears a distance between the two, which however is not

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really the case. This distance is sought to be annulled, as already seen, by means of a *vṛtti* which shows up the underlying identity, in howsoever fragmentary a manner. The function of a *pramātā* is thus not to create a novel object on its own, but only to manifest the basic identity which already obtains. The knowing consciousness comes to know its alter-ego as it were which is essentially its own. Knowledge is a discovery or revelation (*abhedābhivyakti*), not a creation or distortion; the Advaita is frankly realistic in its epistemology. Distinguishing between action and knowledge, Śaṅkara points out that the latter is rooted in objectivity (*vastutantra*), not affected by personal equations (*puruṣa-buddhyapekṣa*). A *pramāṇa vṛtti* removes the veil behind which the object, and its identity with consciousness, remain hidden (*āvaraṇābhibhava*). The object nevertheless is really there to be so revealed; it does not come into being by the act of being known. Only the knownness of the object depends on a *pramāṇa*, and not its being, since being is prior to being known. The object can exist self-identically under both the conditions, viz. as unknown, or again as known, since it is affected by neither of them. All knowledge is thus made possible by the destruction of the previous unknown-ness of the object to be known. The object had existed even before it came to be known.

But how do we know all this? We know an object only while knowing it; that is a tautology. So how do we know that the object had enjoyed a prior unknown existence? And lacking such an

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assurance, what could prevent the subjectivist from maintaining that the being of the object was precipitated by its knownness, that it came into being only when it came to be known, i.e. that its *esse* is its *percipi*? The Advaita contends that the previous unknownness of the object is also actually known. When knowing the object we also know that the object had existed before, and that we are not creating it. The only way to safeguard the *ratio cognoscendi* of realism is to accept a known unknownness, paradoxical as it may sound. Knowing something now is not possible without having known the previous unknownness.

This kind of knowledge however cannot be empirical. Knowing unknownness can only be a transcendental way of knowing. Empirical knowledge is through some *pramāṇa* or other, but there can be no *pramāṇa* for unknown existence, for the simple reason that the object would in that case not remain unknown. The object can remain covered (*āvaraṇa*) only so long as a *pramāṇa* does not come into play. *Āvaraṇa* exists only prior to *pramāṇajñāna*, since the latter destroys it. There must be some consciousness that is never covered, from which *avidyā* cannot hide anything, and everything is revealed to it always. This is the *sākṣī* consciousness, ever uncovered (*anāvṛta*), which can know without a *pramāṇavṛtti*, since it has to know the covering itself that is destroyed by such a *vṛtti*. The *sākṣī* cannot form part of empirical discourse (*vyavahāra*), except as its presupposition. It is timelessly present, and forms the back-

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ground even of waking experience, but it is not distinguishable then since it is obscured like the light of the lamp in a strong breeze, when its illumining function seems to be dissipated. It knows everything directly without the intervention of any *pramāṇa* or *vṛtti*. Even a *vṛtti* has to be revealed directly, since there cannot be a *vṛtti* for a *vṛtti*. *Sākṣī* knows the *antaḥkaraṇa* directly. Everything is known by the *sākṣī*, either directly as in the case of the mental states (happiness etc.), the illusory, and the unknownness of things, or indirectly via the pramātā, i.e. all *pramāṇajñāna*. *Ajñāna* is known directly (*sākṣipratītisiddha*), in itself (*svarūpa*). Thus the real and the unreal are both equally objects of *sākṣī*, the unreal directly, the real, by removing its covering through a *vṛtti*. The real is covered, the unreal is ever uncovered. The latter has no covering, no unknown existence. In fact this is the criterian for distinguishing between the real and the unreal. That is unreal which is all appearance, having no hidden ontological resources. It cannot exist in any other way except as it appears, and in the process it is completely exhausted (*pratibhāsamātraśarīratva*).

The *sākṣī* thus knows the object both as known and also as unknown. The empirical self (*cidābhāsa*, i.e. the *jīva* with *buddhi*) is exhausted in generating knownness. It has no means of knowing unknown existence. Everything, all *vṛttis* and also their absence, is revealed by the *sākṣī* consciousness. Even prior to knownness, even before a *vṛtti* arising, the object is revealed as unknown. The witnessing consciousness

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is different from what it witnesses, and cannot arise simultaneously with the latter. Being the witness of a *vṛtti*, the *sākṣī* must be present also in its prior non-existence (*vṛtti prāgabhāva*). It is only in this way that the consciousness 'I am ignorant' is made possible. How do I know that I am ignorant, except by actually seeing my ignorance! This must be a transcendental seeing, belonging to a pre-*vṛtti* consciousness, since a *vṛtti* and ignorance cannot coexist. Pure consciousness is however not antithetical to ignorance; consciousness that is opposed to *ajñāna* is not pure, but reflected in a *vṛtti* of *antaḥkaraṇa*. The judgment 'I do not know' implies an identification of *sākṣī* and *pramātā*. It is the *sākṣī* that perceives ignorance directly, while the *pramātā* has the notion of 'I'. The same identification is revealed in the memory of deep sleep, viz. in the judgment 'I slept well'. Memory belongs to the 'I' as circumscribed by the intellect (*antaḥkaraṇāvacchinna*). The revelation of the *sākṣī* is by means of its *avidyāvṛtti*, which is direct revelation and does not itself require being known through another *vṛtti*, or there would be an infinite series of *vṛttis*. Revelation itself however is not a *vṛtti*, not even *avidyāvṛtti*, but is the very nature of consciousness. *Sākṣī* is that consciousness which is reflected in *avidyāvṛtti*, and the latter is known by that very consciousness which it seeks to cover, as a solar eclipse is made visible by the sun itself. Since the *sākṣī* reveals everything without exception, whether known or even as unknown, it is called omniscient (*sarvajña*). Nothing remains unknown to it, not even unknownness.

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How is such a transcendental consciousness to be apprehended ? What is the *pramāṇa* for its existence ? What kind of evidence is to be adduced for the self ? There is really no evidence for the ultimate subject, since nothing empirical could reach it. Perception is not the evidence for the self, since perceptual knowledge depends on objects which are all determined by *upādhis*, and the perceiving self cannot be the real self as it is only the reflection of the self in the *upādhi* of *buddhi*. Nor can any other *pramāṇa* be adequate to it. Objects are known by *pramāṇas*, which themselves presuppose the self, and cannot therefore prove the latter. A *vṛtti* is directed toward an object, not the self. How could the knower itself be known ? It cannot be known by another consciousness ; there cannot be a knower behind the knower, without launching an infinite regress (*anavasthā*). Nor could it be known by itself ; the subject cannot be its own object. The two functions cannot be combined simultaneously. The self is not the subject and object at once (*karmakartṛtvavirodha*). Self-consciousness is not the real nature of the self, which cannot be known as an 'I'. The self-conscious 'I', in the judgment 'I am happy' for example, is not the self, but is itself an object. Thus the real self is unknown, not apprehended at all by any means. The seer of seeing cannot be seen (*na dṛṣṭer draṣṭāram paśyeḥ*). The knower remains unknown (*avijñātam vijñātṛ*), since who will know the knower (*vijñātāram are kena vijānīyāt*) ? The self is involved in the empirical 'I'—the *antaryāmī* resides in *āditya* —but

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it is not known by the latter. It is beyond the 'I', is not distinguished into 'I' and 'you', but is the seer of both. What knows everything cannot be known (*na vijñāter vijñātāram vijānīyāḥ*). Being the precondition of all knowledge, it cannot be seen by empirical seeing. It cannot be presented as an object, cannot be objectified as a 'this'. The seer itself remains unseen, since there is no other seer. It is the indwelling essence of knowledge (*antaryāmī*). It illumines everything and, as such, cannot be illumined by anything else. It can only be discovered regressively, as the presupposition of the very possibility of knowing. The self is therefore described as *pratyagātman*, i.e. the inward or backward (*pratyak*) principle of knowledge. It can only be indicated indirectly or transcendentally. It is apprehended as what remains when all apprehension ceases.

But though the self is not known by one who claims to know it, since it is not knowable by something else, it is still not nonexistent. It is yet immediate and is therefore intuitively known by one who does not know it, in knowing anything whatever. It is self-evident, and is *known as such*. Though there is no seeing of the seer, that is because the seeing itself is the seer and therefore it is never an object and cannot be demonstrated as 'this'. If consciousness were not self-revealed, the whole world would remain unrevealed (*jagadāndhya prasaṅga*). It is evident in itself (*svayamprabha*), unknown yet immediate (*avedya* and *aparokṣa-vyavahāra-yogya*). It is evident even when shrouded. Though not known

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in the objective way by any *pramāṇa*, it is not unreal, being immediate (*ananyānubhava*). It sees the objects and also their apparent seer (*pramātā*). It is not the *pramātā* since it sees even the absence of objects. The twin judgments 'I know' and 'I don't know' are both made possible by the underlying principle that always knows. Only it cannot be pointed out by means of a *pramāṇa*, not being an object. Though unknown, its existence is however undeniable, since denial itself is the vindication of awareness.

Self-luminosity (*svayamprakāśa*) does not mean self-consciousness (*svasaṁvedana*). A Hegelian or a Sautrāntika might plead for the latter, and see no difficulty in the same consciousness being its own object. Consciousness, for them, contains an internal diversity so that it can stand alienated from itself, and be the subject and the object both at once. The Advaita however thinks that the essence of consciousness is its unrelatedness (*asaṅga*); it is so pure that it is not related even to itself in terms of self-consciousness. It is 'in-itself' (*en soi*) but not 'for-itself' (*pour soi*). Its self-certifying nature means, not that it evidences itself or that it is to be guaranteed by something else, but simply that it does not stand in any need of being evidenced or being guaranteed at all, being itself the source of all evidence. If the self were something remote and hidden, then the problem of seeking evidence for it might have been meaningful. It is however absolutely immediate, since it is that which is doing the search for any evidence for anything whatever, that to which all

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evidence is finally presented. The question is not about something 'out there' in the wilderness, but about myself, and how can I get behind myself and treat it as something susceptible of any doubt or controversy ?

The object too, it might be contended, is immediate. We make a distinction between something ostensibly given and something only inferred or learnt from others. Perception is the eivdence for the immediate givenness of the object. How is then this kind of perceptual immediacy of the object different from the immediacy of the self ? It has to be remembered that the object had not been immediate, or rather its immediacy had not been explicit, from the very outset. Prior to being known, its immediacy was suppressed as it were by its unknownness, and a complicated process had to intervene before its immediacy could manifest itself. A *vṛtti* removed its veil of unknownness and its immediate presence, which had really been there all along, could be fully exhibited. The immediacy of the object therefore is mediated or conditional. The self however ever remains unknown. Being the ultimate subject no process can objectify it and make it known. It is nevertheless not nonexistent ; the principle of illumination is never absent. Being the precondition of all knowing, its immediacy is self-evident. This immediacy however is unconditional (*sākṣādaparokṣa*) or absolute. It does not require the intervention of any *vṛtti* or *pramāṇa* to make its self-luminosity evident. That is self-evident whose immediacy is irrepressible and

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whose unknownness cannot take anything away from its illumination. It is immediate (*aparokṣa-vyavahāra-yogya*) inspite of its unknownness (*avedya*). Conditional immediacy is something to be brought about, as in the case of the objects to be known. Unconditional immediacy however is something intrinsic, in itself. It is *sākṣāt* as there is no distance involved here which would have to be overcome. Immediacy is primary in the case of the self, not derivative which is derived from the operation of the senses (*akṣajanya*). The self reveals everything, egoity (*ahaṅkāra*), intellect (*buddhi*) and the objects, but even in their absence it remains self-luminous or self-evident, as its illumination never goes out (*na hi draṣṭur dṛṣṭer viparilopo vidyate*).

In ordinary discourse, witnessing is associated with two characteristics, viz. (*a*) consciousness and (*b*) indifference. The unconscious, being inert, cannot be a witness to anything. A piece of stone cannot give evidence. Further, this conscious agent must not itself get involved in what it sees. It must not sit on judgment and evaluate the merits of the case. It has simply to take note of what happens before it. The *sākṣī* therefore cannot make distinctions of reality and unreality. Both are equally presented to it and it witnesses them with equal indifference. Distinctions are all made by *buddhi*. The empirical 'I' cannot remain indifferent to what it sees. It is itself involved and cannot be neutral. It will reject the illusory. But the illusory was actually revealed by some consciousness ; that is the *sākṣī* or the witness, noticing passively even the illusory.

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IX

MODES OF CONSCIOUSNESS

The *sākṣī* is the pure unrelated neutral consciousness, the impartial witness of everything. That does not mean equating it with *brahman*, the absolute. Though in itself unrelated, the *sākṣī* is discriminated only in a relational context. It cannot be evidenced in the absence of something to be illumined. If there is nothing to be seen, seeing and not-seeing coalesce into one. *Brahman* therefore is not the seer; since there is no other to be seen. *Brahman* is the utter 'beyond', the *turīya*; it is not the *sākṣī*, since even *ajñāna* is not there to be witnessed. The *sākṣī*, the witness of deep sleep (*prājña*), is pure undifferentiated consciousness, but it is still covered by pure darkness. Even in deep sleep, the embodiment (*prāṇa*) of the *jīva* is potentially present as undifferentiated. Though it is not modified or differentiated because of *avidyā*—it is not *avidyā-viśiṣṭa*, but pure consciousness itself–still it is confronted with things to be witnessed (*sākṣyas*), i.e. with duality. Consciousness becomes witness only because of *ajñāna*, it is a *sākṣī* only in relation to the *sākṣyas*, the objects to be witnessed. It is still not illusory, since it is the same basic principle of illumination, the ultimate witness, not to be witnessed by anything else. Its 'witnessing' (*sākṣitva*) however is not intrinsic to it; right knowledge dispels both *sākṣyatva* and consequently *sākṣitva*.

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The relation between the *sākṣī*, the transcendental self, and the *pramātā* or *jīva*, the empirical ego-consciousness, is extremely peculiar. They are not really two independent selves, leading their own private but parallel lives. The subject or the seer, or rather the principle of seeing (*dṛk*), is pure consciousness or the ultimate self (*sākṣī*). It is self-identical, undifferentiated and one, but is differentiated into a plurality of centres of consciousness because of *upādhis*, so that distinctions emerge between *brahman*, *sākṣī*, *Iśvara* and *jīva*. *Brahman* is not the subject, since the distinction between subject and object is meaningless in that context. It is the utter 'beyond', the sheer transcendence of all duality, and is therefore indeterminate and unconditional (*nirupādhika*). The other levels of selfhood are all differentiated because of limitations (*upādhis*). So far as the empirical self is concerned, the *sākṣī* is the real self. It cannot however be apprehended in isolation, since egoity is always superimposed on it. Though pure in itself, it is never available in its purity. It is unrelated, but discovered only as the precondition of the primary epistemic relatedness. The self cannot be distinguished by the empirical subject (*jīva*), because of its primal ignorance (*mulāvidyā*), the function of the latter being covering and projection (*āvaraṇa* and *vikṣepa*). Ignorance hides the self and projects the ego (*jīva*) instead. Egoity or the 'I'-consciousness is thus not the self, but merely imposed on it. The 'I' is an illusion or reflection, being consciousness as reflected in *buddhi* which is imagined to be present

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in the self. A mere reflection takes over the function of the original, viz. illumination, just as a mirror can illumine when it reflects the sun's rays. Illumination is common to them, since it comes from the same source. The illusory takes over the character of the ground. *Sākṣī* is the ground consciousness which underlies the *jīva* illusion, along with its satellites like the body, the sense, mind etc. Their difference consists in the fact that the real self or the *sākṣī* is unrelated and therefore unmodifiable, whereas the *jīva* is relational and the sense of 'I' gets modified owing to a change in its external adjuncts, as in the judgment 'I am no longer young'. *Sākṣī* is the ground of the *jīva* illusion which is only reflected consciousness (*cidābhāsa*). It is of the nature of egoity (*ahaṅkāra*). Like light, the *sākṣī* illumines objects when they are present, but is self-luminous even when egoity (*ahaṅkāra*) is absent, as in deep sleep (*suṣupti*). The 'I' is as much an object of revelation as any other empirical object, and like the latter it is illumined, not directly by means of *avidyāvṛtti*, but through an *antaḥkaraṇavṛtti*. Sense of ego obtains only as embodied. Pure consciousness enters the body (metaphorically of course!) and witnesses *buddhi* as its *sākṣī*. The self resides in both the bodies, the gross and the subtle, as their ground, and seems to be determined or limited by them, but is never modified or affected by them. The body is explicitly revealed by means of an *antaḥkaraṇavṛtti*, which gives the clearest sense of embodiment. Such *vṛttis* however have gaps in between them, when bodily awareness

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still persists but only indefinitily. This continuous revelation is by the *sākṣī*, and hence there is never any doubt about the 'I', since *ahaṅkāra* is always there and is being continuously illumined. 'I'-consciousness persists, even while a *vṛtti* is making us know something else. The *jīva* appropriates this continuing consciousness of 'I' because of mutual ascription between *jīva* and *sākṣī*.

The *jīva* is defined as consciousness limited by the intellect (*antaḥkaraṇāvacchinna*) while its *sākṣī* is consciousness associated with *avidyā* or, alternatively, with the intellect (*avidyopahita*, or *antaḥkaraṇopahita*). The conditions of '*avacchedaka*' and '*upādhi*, are both adjectival, and are both determinants. But '*avacchedaka*' is essentially tied to its term, while the connection between an '*upādhi*' and what it qualifies (*upahita*) is loose and non-essential. The *sākṣī* is not limited by its *upādhi* ; its only fault is that it has lent its presence, allowed its illumining presence to be borrowed by something else. The *antaḥkaraṇa* is inert (*jaḍa*) and cannot reveal ; it acts as the '*upādhi*' of *sākṣī* which reveals with its help.

The 'I' is thus used in very many different senses and is highly equivocal in its denotation. Pure consciousness (*sākṣī*) is not its referent, since it is the ground of the 'I'-illusion. 'I' primarily means the empirical ego (*jīva*) which is the reflection of pure consciousness (*cidābhāsa*). But, secondarily, when consciousness and its reflection are discriminated, they can both be called 'I', since the first primary

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'I' was based on their nondistinction. The *sākṣī* is the 'I' only secondarily, only in this derivative sense.

Hence the knowledge 'I am *sākṣī*' is false, since it comes from its association with its reflection, i.e. *cidābhāsa* or the embodied *jīva*, but the knowledge is then transferred to the ground. The *sākṣī* in itself is not the 'I'.

Is the *sākṣī* consciousness individualized, and peculiar to the different *jīvas*, or is it itself one for all of them? The question is extremely difficult and the answer is unclear. The *pramātā* is *antaḥkaraṇāvacchinna* or *antaḥkaraṇaviśiṣṭa*, but what about the *sākṣī*? If it is described as *antaḥkaraṇopahita*, then it would be individual and many. The *antaḥkaraṇa* is always present, even during deep sleep (*suṣupti*). If this is the *upādhi* of *sākṣī*, then there are many *sākṣīs*, corresponding to many *jīvas*. But, on the other hand, who is to witness the different *sākṣīs*? The proposition is not assertible, being self-stultifying. There can be only one *sākṣī*; difference pertains to what is a cause or an effect but the self is neither. It is therefore not *antaḥkaraṇopahita*, but *avidyopahita*.

The same ambivalence percolates down to the concept of *Īśvara* and its relation to *sākṣī*. *Īśvara* too receives the same description (*ajñānopādhi*) as the *sākṣī* so that the distinction between the two forms of consciousness remains highly unclear. *Sākṣī* is sometimes thought to be even more basic than

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Īśvara. It is the original (*bimba*), while *Īśvara* is its reflection (*pratibimba*) in *avidyā*. Or again, if *Īśvara* too is an original type of consciousness, then *sākṣī* is supposed to be the underlying continuity of *jīva* and *Īśvara*. Alternatively, the two are simply equated, so that *Īśvara* is *sākṣī*, appearing in two ways as *jīva* and *Īśvara*. To compound these complications, a distinction is made between *Īśvara* and *Īśvarasākṣī*, the former being defined as *māyāvacchinna*, the latter as *māyopahita*. The *upādhi* (*māyā*) being one, *Īśvarasākṣī* can only be one while *jīvasākṣīs* may be many.

All these complications arise because of the problem of understanding and clarifying the structure of *Īśvara* consciousness. On the one hand *Īśvara* is not empirical like the *jīva*. Though it operates within the frame-work of ignorance, it is not deluded by the latter. The underlying ground of the world illusion is never hidden from *Īśvara*. Consequently the hiding function (*āvaraṇa*) of ignorance does not operate here. A distinction is made between *avidyā* and *māyā*, and *Īśvara* is associated only with the latter. He creates with the help of the power of ignorance, but is himself not deceived by it. The deception is felt by the *jīva* who takes it to be real. *Īśvara* sees everything as it really is, viz. a pretence, a makebelieve. He sees the underlying reality all the while the creative potentialities of illusion are being played out. He sees thus the real and the unreal at once, and nothing remains hidden from his ken. Since there is no covering (*āvaraṇa*) for *Īśvara*, his knowledge would not be like

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that of *pramātā*. He does not stand in need of a *vṛtti* to remove the veil before things could be known. For *Īśvara* there can be no unknown existence. In all these respects, the concept of *Iśvara* is comparable to that of *sākṣī* for which knowledge is direct revelation. But on the other hand, *Īśvara* is a Person, not merely a principle. He has an individuality made possible only by the 'I'-consciousness. He is not bound, and has never been in bondage. *Sākṣī* too may be said to be free, but it is not conscious of its freedom, and cannot even make the distinction between bondage and freedom. *Īśvara* makes all these distinctions and has the saving knowledge (*tattvajñāna*) timelessly. He is a free person but unlike a liberated soul, has never been otherwise (*sadaiva muktaḥ*).

The notion of the liberated soul is another enigma for the Advaita. The dispelling of an illusion yields the knowledge of the ground. *Brahman* is the ground of the cosmic illusion, and the negation of the latter (*neha nānāsti kiñcana*) should lead to the knowledge of *brahman*. The orthodox view does not however favour understanding freedom in terms of *brahmabhāvāpatti*, unless freedom should mean freedom for all (*sarvamukti*). As long as there are souls still unfree, world illusion continues so that realization of *brahman* should not have been achieved. Sometimes a distincion is made between *nivṛtti* and *bādha*, corresponding to individual ignorance and cosmic ignorance (*tūlāvidyā* and *mūlāvidyā*). Freedom of one person is not really the total cancellation of ignorance, but merly rendering it ineffective for that person. This is *nivṛtti*. *Bādha*

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is the final and total cessation of ignorance, so that there would no more be a single soul still in ignorance ; consequently the world appearance disappears, not merely for one liberated soul, but for everybody, since the distinction between one soul and another has itself been the product of ignorance. Till that happens, *mukti* is characterized as *Īśvarabhāvāpatti* or *sākṣī bhāvāpatti*. *Īśvara* is *brahman* self-conscious of itself. *Brahman* cannot declare itself as *brahman*, cannot make the judgment '*aham brahmāsmi*'; *Īśvara* alone can. The consciousness of having attained freedom, or rather, getting out of the illusion of having ever been unfree, is being self-conscious of freedom. The difficulty in this view is that each liberated soul has a history, its freedom is an event in time, but *Īśvara* has no history, being free timelessly. The most plausible view is to understand *mukti* as *sākṣībhāvāpatti*. Everything appears before the free person without affecting him in any way. He remains utterly neutral, a passive spectator of the panorama of the cosmic process. Here again the difficulty is that the *sākṣī* cannot distinguish between the real and the unreal, so that right knowledge (*tattvajñāna*) has no meaning for it. The world illusion is negated, not by the *sākṣī* consciousness, but by the final suicidal act of the *buddhi* (*akhaṇḍākāra vṛtti*). The *sākṣī* is certainly not in bondage but nor can it be described as free. The liberated soul shares with *sāksī* its characteristic indifference, but it also discriminates between the essential and the spurious. Not only is it free but it is also conscious of its freedom.

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These difficulties simply point to the fact that there can be no theoretically intelligible description of the transcendent in terms of the empirical. Descriptions are merely 'models and metaphors', indicating the direction of transcendence which defies all philosophic understanding.

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REFERENCES

1. Kaṭha 3.4.
2. Māṇḍ. Kāṇḍ. 3.11.
3. ahamahampratyayālambanam. eko'dvitīyaḥ. avaśiṣṭaḥ sarva dvaitabādhe'pyabādhitaḥ. Śivaḥ paramānanda-bodharūpaḥ.. kevalo nirdharmakaḥ. tenādvitīyaḥ sarvapramāṇābādhyaḥ.. Ś.B. p. 12.
4. na dṛṣṭer draṣṭāraṁ paśyer na śruteḥ śrotāraṁ śṛṇuyā na matermantāram manvīthā na vijñāter vijñātāraṁ vijānīyāḥ. Bṛh. 3.4.2.
   ....ta ātmā'ntaryāmyamṛto'dṛṣṭo draṣṭāṭśrutaḥ śrotā'mato mantā'vijñāto vijñātā nānyo'to'sti draṣṭā nānyo'to' sti śrotā nānyoto' sti mantā nānyo to' sti vijñātāiṣa ta ātmāntaryāmyamṛto' to'nyadārtam....Ibid 3.7.23. Cf. Kaṭha 5.15, Muṇḍ. 2.2.10-11, Śveta. 6.14 (See Ś.B. pp. 20-21).
5. Māṇḍ. Kār. 1.3-5.
6. Bṛh. 1.4.7. and 3.4.2.
7. Ibid. 3.7.1.
8. Ibid. 3.7.23.
9. Ibid. 4.3.6.
10. Ibid. 4.3.9.
11. Māṇḍ. Kār. 1.3-5.
12. bahiḥprājño vibhurviśvo hyantaḥprajñāsu cetasaḥ, ghanaprajñastathāprājña eka eva tridhā smṛtaḥ. Ibid. 1.6. 1-2.
13. Ibid. 7.11.
14. Ibid. 7.12.
15. dvaitasyāgrahaṇaṁ tulyam ubhayoḥ prājñaturyayoḥ, bījanidrāyutaḥ prājñaḥ sa ca tyure na vidyate. —Ibid. 7.13.
16. Muṇḍ. 3.1.1.
17. Kaṭha 3.4.
18. Māṇḍ. Kār. 7.12.
19. Ch. 8.11.1.
20. Tait. 2.1., See Ś. B. thereon.

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21. Praś. 6.2. Vyabhicarati tu jñeyaṁ, na jñānaṁ vyabhicarati kadācidapi jñeyam,.....nahi jñāne'sati jñeyaṁ nāma bhavati kasyacit. (Ś. B. thereon).
22. Bṛh. 1.4.7. and Ś. B. thereon.
23. Ibid. 1.4.10 and Ś. B. thereon.
24. Ibid. 1.5.20 and Ś. B. thereon.
25. sa hovācājātaśatrur yatraiṣa etatsupto'bhūdya eṣa vijñānamayaḥ puruṣaḥ....—Ibid. 2.1.17.
26. Ibid. 2.1.19.
27. Ibid. 3.4.1.
28. Ibid. 3.4.2.
29. Ibid. 3.7.1. and 3.7.23.
30. ....ātmaivāsya jyotirbhavatītyātmanaivāyaṁ jyotiṣāste palyayate karma kurute vipalyetīti.—Ibid. 4.3.6.
31. ....svena bhāsā svena jyotiṣā prasvapityatrāyaṁ puruṣaḥ svayaṁ jyotirbhavati. —Ibid. 4.3.9.
32. Ibid. 4.3.18.
33. Ibid. 4.3.11.
34. Yadvai tanna paśyati paśyanvai tanna paśyati na hi draṣṭur dṛṣṭer viparilopo vidyate, vināśitvāt. na tu taddvitīyamasti tato' nyadvibhaktaṁ yatpaśyet. —Ibid. 4.3.23.
35. BSŚB 1.1.1.
36. Ibid. 1.1.21.
37. Viṣayābhāvad iyaṁ acetanamānatā na caitanyābhāvād iti. Ibid. 2.3.18. Cf. Ś. B. on Praś. 6.2.
38. Ś. B. on Kaṭha 3.4., Kena. 2.3.
39. Ibid.
40. Ibid.
41. Ibid.
42. Ś. B. on Tait. 2.1.
43. Ś. B. on Bṛh. 1.4.7.
44. Ibid. 2.4.14.
45. Ibid. 3.4.2.
46. Ibid. 4.3.9.
47. Ś. B. on Māṇḍ. Kār. 1.6. 1-2.
48. Ś. B. on Bṛh. 3.7.1.

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49. ato' smād antaryāmiṇo nānyo' sti draṣṭā, tathā nānyo' to'—sti śrotā, nānyo' to' sti mantā, nānyo' to' sti vijñātā.... eṣa te ātmā' ntaryāmyamṛtaḥ. asmādīśvarād ātmano' anyad ārtam.—Ibid. 3.7.23.
50. Ibid. 3.8.12.
51. Ibid. 4.3.22.
52. P.P. pp. 85-86.
53. Ibid. pp. 29-31.
54. Ibid. pp. 89-91.
55. Na hi dehendriyādiṣu ahamabhimāna-hīnasya suṣuptasya pramātṛtvaṁ dṛśyate.—Ibid. pp. 140-41.
56. ataḥ svayam asaṅgasyāvikāriṇo'vidyādhyāsmantareṇa na pramātṛtvam upapadyate.—Ibid. pp. 143-44.
57. sākṣiṇo brahmarūpatvaṁ brahmaivetyabhidhīyate, saṁsargaśaṅkānutyartham evakāraḥ prayujyate.—V.S.V. 219, p. 2335.
58. Ibid. V. 50, p. 1235.
59. ātmeti ca pramātrādeḥ svarūpam abhidhīyate, pramātrādyāgamāpāya sākṣitvāt tatsvarūpatā.—Ibid. V. 20, p. 1704.
60. yadyasmin vyabhicaryeta tatsvarūpaṁ na kutracit, kuṇḍalitvaṁ yathā puṁsaḥ sākṣitvāvyabhicāravān.—Ibid. V. 21, p. 1705.
61. Ibid. V. 115, p. 2078.
62. Ibid. V. 56, p. 1723.
63. Ibid. V. 60, p. 1724.
64. Ibid. V. 325-331, pp. 2197-99.
65. Yat sarvavyāpi caitanyaṁ tad dṛṣṭim vyāpnuyāttayā, dṛṣṭyaikatām upagatam āgantukamivekṣyate. vyāptatvameva draṣṭṛtvam nā' kriye draṣṭṛtā svataḥ, na dhūmāgnyoriva vyāptiḥ kintu sraksarpayoriva.—Ibid. V. 62-63, pp. 1724-25.
66. Ibid. v. 37-38, p. 2022.
67. sābhāsa pariṇāmena duḥkhyasmītyapi dhīrbhavet, tathā sābhāsam ajñānam na vedmītyabhidhīyate.—Ibid. V. 40. p. 2023.

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68. anyathā" tmani kauṭasthyād buddhaucaitanya-varjanāt, sarvo'pi vyavahāraḥ syād andhakāra pranṛtyavat.—Ibid. v. 41. p. 2023.
69. Ibid. v. 52-54, pp. 1721-22.
70. Ibid. v. 71-72, p. 1729.
71. cf. A.S. p. 550.
72. V. S. v. 63, p. 2037.
73. Ibid. v. 45, p. 2026.
74. Ibid. v. 64, p. 2038.
75. Ibid. v. 77, p. 1731.
76. Ibid. v. 65, p. 2039.
77. Ibid. v. 40, p. 1713.
78. paśyanneva katham supta iti cedabhidhīyate, draṣṭurna lupyate dṛṣṭir yasmātpaśyannataḥ sthitaḥ, tasya draṣṭur bhāsikā yā cideṣā dṛṣṭirucyate, tadetatsākṣicaitanyam ityāhurvedavādinaḥ.—Ibid. v. 300; v. 305, pp. 2184-85.
79. Ibid. v. 157, p. 2106.
80. Ibid. v. 166-8, p. 2110.
81. Ibid. v. 80. p. 2062.
82. Ibid. v. 33-34, pp. 1710-11.
83. draṣṭṛ darśana dṛśyānām sākṣiṇaḥ svaprabhasya tat, pramāṇāgocaratvaṁ tu vastusvābhāvyato bhavet.—Ibid. v. 54, p. 1722.
84. Ibid. v. 72. p. 1729.
85. Ibid. v. 74-75, p. 1730.
86. pramāturjāyate vṛttiścakṣuṣā rūparañjitā, draṣṭavyaṁ tu tayā rūpaṁ na sākṣī dṛśyate tayā.—Ibid. v. 80, p. 1732.
87. Ibid. v. 88, p. 1734.
88. Ibid. v. 43-44, p. 2025.
89. Ibid. v. 69, p. 1727.
90. Ibid. v. 26, p. 2019.
91. svayaṁ seddhum asāmarthyāt sādhakāntarahānataḥ, bādhakasya ca sadbhāvāt tamasā sākṣitā citeḥ.—A quotation under V.S. v. 101, p. 2072.
92. Ibid. v. 117, p. 2079.

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93. cillopābhāvataḥ sākṣī paśyannevetyudīryate, akartaryapi kartṛtvāropaṇaitadudīraṇam.—Ibid. v. 331, p. 2199; also see v. 325-330, pp. 2197-98.
94. Ibid. v. 63, p. 1725.
95. Ibid. v. 309-12, pp. 2187-88.
96. Ibid. v. 22, p. 1705.
97. vyatirekānvayābhāvāḥ kāryakāraṇavastuni, akāraṇam akāryaṁ tadvyatirekādibhāk katham.—Ibid. v. 27, p. 1708.
98. paramo loka ityuktā sarvabhāvasya vastutā, suṣuptau tattu sārvātmyaṁ sarvairapyanubhūyate.—Ibid. v. 260, p. 2165.
99. Viv., p. 85.
100. nanu keyam abhivyaktiḥ? āvaraṇābhibhava eva na svarūpātiśayaḥ.—Ibid. p. 307.
101. sarvagatamapi caitanyam avidyāvṛtatvāt svayamapi tāvan na prakāśate.—Ibid. p. 310.
102. Ibid. p. 312.
103. Ibid. p. 310.
104. na ca āśrayapratiyogijñānabhūtamapi sākṣīcaitanyaṁ bhāvāntarasya ajñānasya nivartakaṁ. tasya ajñānaviṣayapratibhāsatvāt.—Ibid p. 82.
105. Ibid. p. 89.
106. Ibid. p. 211.
107. Ibid. p. 247.
108. Ibid. p. 259.
109. Ibid. p. 262.
110. sarvaṁ vastu jñātatayā vā ajñātatayā vā sākṣicaitanyasya viṣaya eva—Ibid. pp. 83-84.
111. pūrvānavagatim avijñāya idānīmeva avagatam ityavadhāraṇāyogāt.—Ibid. p. 95.
112. Ibid. p. 96.
113. Ibid. p. 262.
114. Ibid. p. 263.
115. kin tu avidyaiva bāhyadoṣanimittakāraṇāpekṣayā rajatākāreṇa sākṣicaitanyasya rajatāvacchedajñānābhāsākāreṇa ca pariṇamamāna svakāryeṇa saha sākṣicaitanyasya viṣayabhāvaṁ pratipadyate iti te matam.—Ibid. pp. 153-54.

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116. Ibid. p. 260.
117. Ibid. p. 291.
118. Ibid. p. 292.
119. Ibid. p. 364.
120. Ibid. p. 370.
121. Ibid. p. 389.
122. antaḥkaraṇa tadvṛttisākṣityādāvanekadhā, kuṭastha eva sarvatra pūrvācāryairviniścitaḥ.—P. D. VIII. 25.
123. Ibid. VIII. 40, 47.
124. Ibid. V. 3.
125. Ibid. VI. 36, 41.
126. Ibid. VI. 58.
127. kūṭastho brahma jīveśāvityevaṁ ciccaturvidhā, ghaṭākāśa-mahākāśau jalākāśābhrakhe yathā.—Ibid. VI. 18.
128. Ibid. I. 3.
129. Ibid. I. 4.
130. Ibid. X. 23.
131. Ibid. X. 24.
132. Ibid. X. 25.
133. Ibid. II. 20.
134. Ibid. II. 23.
135. ahaṅkāraṁ dhiyaṁ sākṣī viṣayānapi bhāsayet, ahaṅkārā-dyabhāve 'pi svayaṁ bhātyeva pūrvavat.—Ibid. X. 12.
136. Ibid. X. 15.
137. ghaṭaikākāradhīsthā cid ghaṭamevāvabhāsayet, ghaṭasya-jñātatā brahmacaitanyenāvabhāsate.—Ibid. VIII. 4.
138. Ibid. VIII. 7.
139. Ibid. VIII. 8.
140. Ibid. VIII. 10.
141. Ibid. VIII. 13.
142. Ibid. VIII. 15.
143. ghaṭo 'yam ityasāvuktir ābhāsasya prasādataḥ, vijñāto ghaṭa ityuktir brahmānugrahato bhavet.—Ibid. VIII. 16.
144. suptotthitasya sauṣupta tamobodho bhavet smṛtiḥ, sā cāva-buddhaviṣayā' vabuddhaṁ tattadā tamaḥ.
—Ibid. I. 5, also see I. 6.

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145. Ibid. VIII. 5.
146. Ibid. VIII. 7.
147. Ibid. VIII. 56.
148. Ibid. VI. 13.
149. adhiṣṭhānatayā dehadvayāvacchinnacetanaḥ, kūṭavan nirvikāreṇa sthitaḥ kuṭastha ucyate.—Ibid. VI. 22.
150. Ibid. VIII. 48.
151. Ibid. VI. 33.
152. Ibid. VI. 35.
153. āropitasya dṛṣṭānte rūpyaṁ nāma yathā tathā, kūṭasthādhyastavikṣepanāmāham iti niścayaḥ.—Ibid. VI. 36.
154. Ibid. VI. 39-41.
155. Ibid. VI. 43.
156. Ibid. VI. 24.
157. Ibid. VI. 25.
158. cetanācetanabhidā kūṭasthātmakṛtā na hi, kintu buddhikṛtā "bhāsakṛtaivetyavagamyatām.—Ibid. VI. 45.
159. Ibid. X. 16.
160. Ibid. IV. 11, VI. 23.
161. Ibid. VII. 7.
162. Ibid. VII. 5-6.
163. Ibid. VIII. 1.
164. Ibid. VII. 8.
165. Ibid. VII. 9-13.
166. kūṭastho'smīti bodho'pi mithyā cenneti ko vadet, na hi satyatayābhīṣṭaṁ rajjusarpavisarpaṇam.—Ibid. VII. 16.
167. Ibid. VIII. 18.
168. Ibid. VIII. 33.
169. Ibid. X. 17-20.
170. Ibid. X. 23.
171. Ibid. VIII. 19.
172. Ibid. VIII. 20.
173. sandhayo'khilavṛttīnām abhāvaścāvabhāsitaḥ,
nirvikāreṇa yenāsau kuṭastha iti cocyate—Ibid. VIII. 21.
174. Ibid. VI. 52.
175. Ibid. XI. 59

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176. parāmarśonubhūte'stītyāsīd anubhavastadā,
cidātmatvātsvato bhāti sukhamajñānadhīstataḥ.—Ibid. XI. 60.
177. Ibid. XI. 62.
178. V. P. pp. 29-30.
179. Ibid. p. 30.
180. ayañca jīvasākṣī pratyātmaṁ nānā, ekatve caitrāvagate maitrasyāpyanusandhānaprasaṅgaḥ. īśvarasākṣī tu māyopahitaṁ caitanyaṁ taccaikam; tadupādhibhūtamāyāyā ekatvāt.—Ibid. p. 31.
181. na hi vṛttiṁ vinā sākṣiviṣayatvaṁ kevalasākṣivedyatvam kintu indriyānumānādi pramāṇa vyāpāramantareṇa sākṣiviṣayatvam—Ibid. pp. 24-25.
182. Ibid. p. 39.
183. Ibid. p. 39.
184. Ibid. pp. 40-41.
185. Ibid. pp. 41-42.
186. ata eva sākṣijñānasya satyāsatyaviṣayatayā prāmāṇyāniyamād aprāmāṇyoktiḥ sāmpradāyikānām—Ibid. p. 42.
187. ahamarthaḥ, anātmā, ahampratyayaviṣayatvāt, śarīravat. —A. S. pp. 601-2.
188. Ibid. p. 603.
189. sā cāvidyā sākṣivedyā na tu śuddhacitprakāśyā. sākṣī cāvidyāvṛttipratibimbitacaitanyam.—Ibid. p. 575.
190. ajñānasya svarūpeṇaiva sākṣivedyatvāt. —Ibid. p. 557.
191. ata evocyate rāhuvat svāvṛtacaitanyaprakāśyā' vidyeti.—Ibid. p. 575.
192. Ibid. p. 650.
193. Ibid. p. 550.
194. Ibid. p. 577.
195. Ibid. p. 577.
196. kiñca jīvaviṣayā vṛttiravidyāvṛttiḥ, na tu pramāṇavṛttiḥ; tasyā evājñānavirodhitvāt—Ibid. p. 591.
197. ahaṅkārastāvad icchādiviśiṣṭa eva gṛhyata ityāvayoḥ samānam. suṣuptau ca na icchādayaḥ iti kathaṁ tadā' hamarthānubhavaḥ ?—Ibid. p. 595.

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198. Ibid. p. 596.
199. Ibid. p. 597.
200. Ibid. p. 590.
201. Ibid. p. 548.
202. Ibid. p. 590.
203. Ibid. p. 652.
204. Ibid. p. 603.
205. Sid. Bin. pp. 42-43, 137.
206. Ibid. pp. 53, 89.
207. Ibid. pp. 118-19.
208. Ibid. p. 106. ff.
209. Ibid. p. 89.
210. vārttikakāramate tu—iśvara eva sākṣīti dvaividhyameve jīveśvarabhedena dṛśaḥ—Ibid. p. 90.
211. Ibid. pp. 42-43.
212. Ibid. p. 137.
213. Ibid. pp. 92-93.
214. tadevaṁ trayāṇāmapyavasthātrayasahitānāṁ viśvataijasaprājñānām avidyātmakatvād dṛśyatvena ca mithyātvād anupahitaḥ kevalaḥ sākṣī turīyākhyo'hamasmītyarthaḥ.—Ibid. p. 141.
215. Ibid. p. 142.
216. Ibid. p. 31.
217. Ibid. p. 33.
218. ātmanaḥ suṣuptisākṣitvān na tatra tadabhāvaḥ....mātṛmānameyānāṁ vyabhicāritve'pi tadbhāvābhāvasākśiṇaḥ kālatraye'pyavyabhicārāt.—Ibid. p. 19.
219. Ibid. p. 36.
220. Ibid. p. 35.
221. tatra jāgṛtsvapnabhogyapadārthajñānābhāve'pi sākṣyākāraṁ sukhākāram avasthā' jñānākāraṁ cāvidyāyā vṛttitrayam abhyupeyate.—Ibid. p. 120.
222. Ibid. pp. 123-24.
223. Ibid. pp. 65.
224. Ibid. p. 72.
225. Ibid. pp. 92-93, cf. p. 134.

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226. ....vārttikakārapādair vyavahāradaśāyāmapi sākṣibhedanirākaraṇāt suṣuptau tadbhedakalpanaṁ kecinmanyante tanmahāmoha evetyavadheyam.—Ibid. p. 137.
227. Ibid. p. 55.
228. Ibid. p. 33
229. Ibid. pp. 137-38.
230. Ibid. pp. 114-15.
231. Ibid. p. 109.
232. Ibid. pp. 110-111.
233. Ibid. pp. 116-17
234. Ibid. pp. 117-18
235. Ibid. p. 118.
236. ubhayākārabādhe'pyadhiṣṭhānabhūta caitanyasyābādhānna śūnyavādaprasaṅgaḥ. jāgṛddaśāyāmapi śuktīdaṅkāravilakṣaṇasya prātītikasyaiva rajatedaṅkārasya bhānābhyupagamācca.—Ibid. pp. 118-19.

This is an echo of the famous passage in the *Saṅkṣepa Śārīraka :* 'adhyastameva hi parisphurati bhrameṣu'.—S. Ś. 1.36.

237. Ibid. pp. 118-19.
238. S. L. S. pp. 96-97.
239. adhyātmaṁ tu viśvataijasaprājñabhedena trīṇi rūpāṇi. tatra suṣuptau vilīne antaḥkaraṇe ajñānamātrasākṣī prājñaḥ, yo'yamihānandamaya uktaḥ.—Ibid. p. 97.
240. Ibid. p. 82.
241. Ibid. p. 83.
242. Ibid. p. 84.
243. Ibid. pp. 88-89.
244. Ibid. p. 174.
245. Ibid. p. 178.
246. atha ko'yaṁ sākṣī jīvātirekeṇa vyavahriyate ?..... dehadvayādhiṣṭhānabhūtaṁ kūṭasthacaitanyaṁ svāvacchedakasya dehadvayasya sākṣād īkṣaṇān nirvikāratvācca sākṣītyucyate.—Ibid. p. 180.
247. Ibid. p. 181.

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248. na ca jīvacaitanyameva sākṣī bhavatu, kiṁ kūṭasthenetī vācyam; laukika-vaidika-vyavahārakartus tasyodāsīna-draṣṭratvāsambhavena 'sākṣī cetā kevalo nirguṇaśca' iti-śrutyukta-sākṣitvāyogāt.—Ibid. p. 182.
249. Ibid. p. 183.
250. Ibid. p. 184.
251. Ibid. p. 184.
252. Ibid. pp. 186-87.
253. Ibid. p. 188.
254. Ibid. p. 190.
255. Ibid. p. 193.
256. vastuto'vidyā'ntaḥkaraṇa taddharmāvabhāsakaṁ sākṣicaitanyaṁ vihāyaivājñānaṁ caitanyam āvṛṇotītyanubhavānusāreṇa kalpanān na kaścidoṣaḥ. ata eva sarvadā teṣām aṇāvṛtaprakāśasaṁsargāt ajñāna-viparītajñāna saṁśayāgocaratvam.—Ibid. p. 194.
257. Ibid. p. 203.
258. Ibid. p. 205.
259. Ibid. pp. 205-6.
260. anye tu—suṣuptāvapyavidyādyanusandhānasiddhaye kalpitām avidyāvṛttim ahaṁkāram aṅgīkṛtyā'hamarthe saṁskāram upapādayanti.—Ibid. p. 210.
261. Ibid. p. 212.
262. Ibid. p. 236.
263. Ibid. p. 237.
264. Ibid. p. 242.
265. Ibid. p. 243.
266. Ibid. p. 244.
267. Ibid. pp. 244-45.
268. Ibid. p. 246.
269. Ibid. p. 247.
270. Ibid. p. 248.
271. Ibid. p. 249.
272. 'atrāyaṁ puruṣaḥ svayamjyotiḥ' iti jāgare ādityādi jyotivyatikārāccakṣurādivṛttisañcārācca durvivekam ātmanaḥ svayamjyotiṣṭvam iti svapnāvasthām adhikṛtya tatrātmanaḥ svayamjyotiṣṭvaṁ pratipādayati.—Ibid. p. 351.

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273. ahaṅkārādīnāmapi kevalasākṣivedyatayā śuktirajatavat prātibhāsikatvam abhimatam iti Citsukhācāryāḥ.—Ibid. p. 365.

274. tattad antaḥkaraṇa-tādātmyāpattyā tattad antaḥkaraṇabhedena bhedavata eva sākṣiṇas tadantaḥkaraṇa sukhaduḥkhādyanubhavarūpatvena tadvyavasthāyā apyupapatteriti.—Ibid. p. 383.

275. *Critique of Pure Reason, A* 116.

276. tasmādyeṣu vyāvartamāneṣu yadanuvartate tattebhyo bhinnaṁ yathā kusumebhyaḥ sūtram.—Bhāmatī, p. 3 of BSŚB.

277. A. S. p. 575.

278. Cf. *Essays in Philosophical Psychology*, ed. D.F. Gustafson p. 264

279. adhyastameva hi parisphurati bhrameṣu,
nānyat kathañcana parisphurati bhrameṣu—S. Ś. 1.36.

280. S. L. S. p. 365.

281. P. P. p. 31.

282. Bṛh. 3.7.9.

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